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DEMONSTRATORS' RIGHT TO FAIR WARNING
CALEB HAYES-DEATS*
ABSTRACT
Protesting has become an integral part of American politics, so
much so that federal courts of appeals have recently restricted police
officers' power to arrest demonstrators who have concededly violated
otherwise valid statutes and regulations. Specifically, courts have found
that, where demonstrators may reasonably, yet mistakenly believe that
police officers have permitted their conduct, officers must give "fair
warning" before arresting or dispersing those demonstrators. In § 1983
suits, courts have even found that demonstrators' right to fair warning is
"clearly established." While the right to fair warning may be clearly
established, its doctrinal roots are not. Ordinarily, the requirement of fair
warning, grounded in the Due Process Clause, guides courts in their
application of statutes. The cases mentioned above, however, consider
not the content of statutes-indeed, the statutes' applicability is
frequently conceded-but instead the conduct of police officers and
demonstrators. As a result, the courts that have recognized
demonstrators' rights to fair warning have not clearly specified whether
the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, or the Due Process Clause
creates that right. Identifying the source of this right is more than an
academic exercise. Such identification will help courts expound the
right's contours and determine its future application. Ultimately, this
Article argues that courts have unconsciously employed the right to fair
warning as a less sweeping form of First Amendment review, one that
applies First Amendment principles to officers' enforcement of a statute,
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RIGHT TO FAIR WARNING
rather than to the statute itself. Only by attributing the right to fair
warning to the First Amendment can courts both explain existing
doctrine and vindicate the principles that earlier decisions have
recognized when invoking that right.
INTRODUCTION
"I never knew until today that a law enforcement
official-city, state, or national-could forgive a
breach of the criminal laws. I missed that in my
law school, in my practice and for the two years
while I was head of the Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice." - Justice Clark
Imagine the following: While walking through your town, you
hear chanting and singing in the distance. As you walk towards these
sounds, you discover that several hundred people have gathered for a
demonstration. Police officers accompany the demonstrators, directing
their movements and making no apparent attempt to discourage further
protest. From the demonstrators' signs and statements, you realize that
they are promoting a cause in which you earnestly believe. And so, you
join them, participating in one of American democracy's great traditions.
After proceeding for several blocks, the demonstration comes to a halt.
Looking ahead, you see a line of police officers preventing further
progress. Officers have also formed a barrier behind the march. On both
sides, they begin arresting demonstrators. As it turns out, the march you
joined lacked a parade permit. Moreover, by proceeding in the middle of
the street, you and your fellow demonstrators have blocked traffic in
violation of your town's ban on disorderly conduct. The officers reach
you. As they slip plastic "flexicuffs" around your wrists, you begin to
wonder: "Am I guilty of a crime?"
According to four Circuit Courts of Appeals, the answer is
clearly no.' So clearly, in fact, that demonstrators may sue officers over
1. See generally Garcia v. Does, 12-2634-cv, 2014 WL 4099270 (2d Cir. Aug.
21, 2014); Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 2011); Buck v. City of
Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2008); Papineau v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46 (2d
Cir. 2006); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
2014]
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW
such arrests.2 But how each court has reached that conclusion varies. The
Seventh Circuit has analyzed an arrest of demonstrators entirely under
the Fourth Amendment, characterizing parallel First Amendment claims
as "largely duplicative.",3 The Second Circuit, in contrast, has held that
even officers who have a "lawful basis to interfere with [a]
demonstration" under the Fourth Amendment can nonetheless violate the
"separate" requirements of the First Amendment.4 In reaching these
conclusions, both the Second and the Seventh Circuits relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in Cox v. Louisiana,5 which analyzed the issue
6primarily under the Due Process Clause.
In each of these cases, courts have recognized a substantially
similar right. Specifically, they have held that, where demonstrators
reasonably believe that they are lawfully exercising their First
Amendment rights, officers cannot arrest or disperse them without first
giving "fair warning as to what [about their conduct] is illegal."7 Most
commonly, courts find that demonstrators reasonably believe that their
actions are lawful because police officers have either expressly or
apparently permitted those actions.8 In other cases, however, courts have
imputed a right to fair warning to demonstrators simply because those
demonstrators "had an undeniable right" to engage in "peaceable protest
activities. Where courts attribute a right to fair warning to
demonstrators, they generally forbid officers from dispersing or arresting
2. Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746-47; Buck, 549 F.3d at 1286-87; Papineau, 465 F.3d
at 61; Dellums, 566 F.2d at 183.
3. Vodak, 639 F.3d at 750.
4. Papineau, 465 F.3d at 60.
5. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
6. Id. at 571-72 ("The Due Process Clause does not permit convictions to be
obtained under such circumstances."); see also Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746; Papineau,
465 F.3d at 60 n.6.
7. Cox, 379 U.S. at 574; see also Garcia v. Bloomberg, 865 F. Supp. 2d 478,
487 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Cox, Papineau, and Vodak for "the basic proposition
that before peaceful demonstrators can be arrested for violating a statutory limitation
on the exercise of their First Amendment rights, the demonstrators must receive 'fair
warning' of that limitation, most commonly from the very officers policing the
demonstration"), aff'd sub nom. Garcia v. Does, 12-2634-cv, 2014 WL 4099270 (2d
Cir. Aug. 21, 2014).
8. See Cox, 379 U.S. at 569; Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269,
1283 (10th Cir. 2008).
9. Papineau, 465 F.3d at 60.
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demonstrators until those demonstrators have received a reasonable
opportunity to conform their conduct to the officers' demands.'0 In
practice, then, the right to fair warning frequently imposes a difficult
burden on officers. Before officers may deploy their customary
enforcement mechanisms, the right to fair warning requires them to
clearly communicate a message to a large mass of people and to give that
mass a reasonable opportunity to comply."
The right to fair warning is surprising. Courts most commonly
refer to the requirement of fair warning when interpreting statutes.'2 In
the cases described above, however, the relevant statutes had provided
sufficient warning,1 3 and courts instead focused on police officers'
enforcement efforts, concluding that officers had failed to adequately
warn demonstrators of the possibility of arrest. 14 But why should officers
enforcing a valid statute have to provide any warning at all? Many of the
relevant statutes have no mens rea requirements,' and ignorance of the
10. Id. (quoting City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1999)) ("[T]he
purpose of the fair notice requirement is to enable the ordinary citizen to conform his
or her conduct to the law.").
11. See Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746 (finding that a bullhorn was "no mechanism..
for conveying a command to thousands of people stretched out [over several
blocks.]").
12. See Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial
Expansion of Federal Criminal Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 455, 455-56 (2001)
(identifying three examples: the void-for-vagueness doctrine, the rule of lenity, and
"the rule that a court may not apply a 'novel construction of a criminal statute to
conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to
be within its scope."' (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997))).
13. See Cox, 379 U.S. at 560, 568.
14. Id. at 571; Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746; Papineau, 465 F.3d at 60-61.
15. See, e.g., Vodak, 639 F.3d at 741 (discussing CHI. MtJNIC. CODE § 10-8-
330, which prohibits parading without a permit); N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 10-
110(a). Moreover, even where statutes impose a mens rea requirement, reasonable
officers could conclude that this requirement was met based on circumstances that
fell far short of "fair warning." For example, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20(5), one of
the statutes at issue in Papineau, prohibits "obstruct(ing] vehicular or pedestrian
traffic" where doing so would "recklessly creat[e] a risk" of "public inconvenience."
Papineau, 465 F.3d at 59. Surely, an officer who witnesses a large group of people
walk down the middle of a street has probable cause to believe that they recklessly
run the risk of obstructing vehicular traffic. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 175-76 (1949).
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law usually provides no defense.16 More surprising still is the fact that
courts often conclude that police officers' conduct creates the need for
fair warning.17 Under most circumstances, such conduct excuses an
offense only where the arrestee can invoke the exceedingly narrow
affirmative defense of entrapment.'8 Thus, the requirement that officers
give fair warning represents a substantial departure from the ordinary
operation of the criminal law, essentially adding another element o
otherwise valid criminal statutes.
To understand the breadth of this departure, one must know its
origin. Yet, courts enforcing the right to fair warning have not clearly
grounded their rationale in the First Amendment, the Fourth
Amendment, or the Due Process Clause. The differences between these
constitutional provisions are significant. While each generally balances
individual liberty interests against the government's concern for order
and efficiency, each does so differently and for distinct reasons. Under
16. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 151 (1994) ("The general rule
that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is
deeply rooted in the American legal system." (quotation marks omitted)); see also
Model Penal Code § 2.04 (outlining the circumstances in which ignorance or
mistake of law qualifies as a defense).
17. See Cox, 379 U.S. at 569-74; Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269,
1283 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Cox, 379 U.S. at 588 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("I never
knew until today that a law enforcement official-city, state or national-could
forgive a breach of the criminal laws. I missed that in my law school, in my practice
and for the two years while I was head of the Criminal Division of the Department of
Justice.").
18. Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1988). Entrapment "has
two related elements: government inducement of the crime, and a lack of
predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the criminal conduct." Id. at
63. Requiring officers to give fair warning to demonstrators as a whole shifts courts'
focus from a particular defendant's mental predisposition to what a reasonable
officer should understand about demonstrators generally. Cf Vodak, 639 F.3d at 745
("Maybe the marchers ... should have guessed that it was a forbidden route as well,
and no doubt some did, but others may simply have been following the crowd.")
(emphasis added).
The Due Process Clause creates a defense for those who act in reliance upon
an official interpretation of a law. See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 425-26 (1959).
The Raley defense bears some resemblance to the defense of entrapment, and courts
considering it ask whether an official, while "speaking for the State," has "clearly
told" a defendant that the law permitted certain conduct. Id. at 425-26. Nonetheless,
demonstrators' right to fair warning differs even from the defense recognized in
Raley. See infra text accompanying notes 239-249.
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the First Amendment, courts attempt to protect robust discourse from
"impermissible deterrence" by considering the expressive interests of not
only the individual litigant-who may concede that a given restriction
appropriately enjoins her conduct-but also others whose protected
speech the restriction might chill.' 9 The Due Process Clause, in contrast,
focuses on a particular defendant, ensuring that "no [one is] held
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed.2 0 Finally, the Fourth Amendment balances
two entirely different considerations: the need for "swift [police] action
predicated upon ... on-the-spot observations," on the one hand, and the
"great indignity and . . . strong resentment" that may result from
"serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person," on the other.21 Given
the differences between the concerns animating each constitutional
provision, one cannot understand the precise contours of demonstrators'
right to fair warning without first determining which constitutional
22
provision creates that right.
This Article attempts to identify the right to fair warning's
constitutional basis. Ultimately, it argues that the First Amendment
provides the most plausible foundation for that right. A careful analysis
of the decisions recognizing the right to fair warning indicates that courts
focus on officers' conduct in order to accommodate First Amendment
concerns, without subjecting the ordinances at issue to the exacting
review that the First Amendment typically requires. Specifically, courts
in those cases appear to attribute a valid, nondiscriminatory purpose to
the ordinance in question; yet these courts also understand that that
23ordinance infringes First Amendment rights. Because of such
infringement, ordinary First Amendment review would likely require that
ordinance's invalidation. But the mere fact that the ordinance sweeps
19. Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 1-2 (1981).
20. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 (1997) (quoting Bouie v. City
of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964)).
21. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-20 (1968).
22. For a discussion of how the right's scope changes based on the
constitutional provision that creates it, see infra Parts I1I.A.3, 11.A.4.
23. Compare Cox v. City of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564 (1965) (holding that
a statute prohibiting protesting "near" courts "vindicate[s] important interests of
society"), with Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1963) (suggesting
that statutes could restrict protests only by "limiting the periods during which the
State House grounds were open to the public").
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overbroadly does not mean that the legislature can draft a narrower
ordinance that accomplishes the same purpose.24 Thus, in these cases,
ordinary First Amendment review appears to force courts to choose
between the ordinance's interests, on the one hand, and the First
Amendment's, on the other. The right to fair warning, in contrast, avoids
such a zero-sum conflict by permitting the courts to balance the relevant
interests. Effectively, the right to fair warning allows courts to review not
the ordinance itself, but instead the ordinance as applied by police
officers in the relevant circumstances. Thus, we can understand the right
to fair warning as a narrower form of First Amendment scrutiny that
accommodates First Amendment concerns without unnecessarily
complicating otherwise legitimate legislative schemes.
Conceptualizing the right to fair warning as a First Amendment
right also provides satisfactory answers to some of the most vexing
questions raised by the existing doctrine. If courts have recognized a
right to fair warning in order to vindicate First Amendment concerns,
then the scope of the right must fully accomplish that purpose. The need
to vindicate First Amendment concerns potentially explains why courts
have made decisions that might otherwise appear puzzling. For example,
whereas Cox recognized a right to fair warning only where officers had
explicitly allowed the conduct at issue,25 later decisions applying Cox
have extended that right to situations in which officers gave only implicit
26permission. The Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause
provide little support for such a result." Yet distinguishing between
24. Cf Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738, 741 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[W]hen a
march is planned for the unknown date of some triggering event,.., even two days'
notice is infeasible.").
25. Cox, 379 U.S. at 571.
26. See Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1283 (10th Cir. 2008)
(arguing that officers "may have implicitly sanctioned the march not only by closing
off streets to traffic, but also by directing the progress and direction of the
procession") (emphasis added).
27. Specifically, the Due Process Clause protects a demonstrator only from
being "held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed." United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997)
(quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964)). In the absence of
some explicit directive from officers, courts would likely expect demonstrators to
reasonably understand that valid, sufficiently specific statutes proscribed their
conduct. Cf Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 425-26 (1959) (creating a defense where
an official had "clearly told" a defendant that the law permitted certain conduct).
146 [Vol. 13
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explicit and implicit permission, as Fourth Amendment and Due Process
Clause jurisprudence might lead courts to do, is unsatisfying. In large
demonstrations, the vast majority of participants will not know what
officers have explicitly permitted the demonstration's leaders or
organizers to do. For the majority of demonstrators, then, discerning
whether officers have explicitly or implicitly permitted others' actions
28will be nearly impossible. Upholding convictions in the latter case, but
not the former, would create a distinction without a difference, at least
from the perspective of a majority of demonstrators. Focusing on First
Amendment concerns, however, resolves the problem of distinguishing
between explicit and implicit permission by leading courts to ask
29whether or not police conduct would have the effect of chilling speech.
Thus, regarding the right to fair warning as a First Amendment right
offers a compelling explanation for the existing doctrine.
By abstracting from the First Amendment principles that have
tacitly guided existing doctrine, courts can generate a coherent and
satisfactory framework for determining how the right should apply in
future cases. First, as suggested above, courts considering demonstrators'
right to fair warning should ask whether officers' actions will chill the
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment asks only whether officers have a "reasonable
ground for the belief' that an arrestee has committed a crime. Maryland v. Pringle,
540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because officers
traditionally have discretion over "when and where to enforce city ordinances," they
can reasonably believe that a decision not to enforce an ordinance at a given time
does not amount to permission to engage in certain conduct. Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. For example, in Garcia v. Bloomberg, demonstrators at the back of a
march watched as hundreds of demonstrators followed police officers onto the
portion of the Brooklyn Bridge reserved for vehicles. 865 F. Supp. 2d 478, 483
(S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff'd sub nom. Garcia v. Does, 12-2634-cv, 2014 WL 4099270 (2d
Cir. Aug. 21, 2014). Although the officers had asked the demonstrators near them
not to follow them onto the bridge, they made no further efforts to stop them, and
those at the back of the march mistakenly concluded that the officers had granted
permission. Id. at 483-84. If demonstrators have difficulty distinguishing between
permission and refusal, surely they will also struggle with the finer distinction
between tacit and explicit permission.
29. See Monaghan, supra note 19, at 1-2. Arrests would chill legitimate
speech in cases of both explicit and implicit permission. Specifically, arrests in cases
of implicit permission would deter bystanders, who do not know whether
demonstrators have received explicit permission, from joining even permitted
marches.
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protected conduct that they attempt to permit. The danger of deterring
protected conduct is especially acute in cases involving the right to fair
warning because the statutes at issue will appear to prohibit protected
conduct. Thus, courts must encourage officers to clearly define not only
what they prohibit, but also what they permit.30 Second, courts must bear
in mind that empowering officers to suspend a statute's normal operation
may create the threat of discriminatory enforcement. To neutralize that
threat, courts should demand that officers adopt enforcement procedures
that openly display, to demonstrators and courts alike, how officers
intend to promote the legitimate purposes of the overbroad statutes they
hope to narrow.3 These two principles, which past cases have suggested,
but not clearly articulated, illuminate what it means to provide
demonstrators with fair warning. Understanding their importance will
allow courts to generate continuity between existing doctrine and future
decisions, which will inevitably have to address many different and
unforeseeable circumstances.
This Article contains four parts. Part I analyzes cases that have
recognized the right to fair warning, noting the right's existing contours
and the questions it raises. Part II then discusses the rights protected by
the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Due Process
Clause, explaining why each provision could serve as a plausible, if not
wholly satisfying, basis for the right to fair warning. Finally, Part III
argues that courts should ultimately characterize the right to fair warning
as a First Amendment right. As set forth below, First Amendment
concerns best explain existing doctrine, and only by focusing on the
interests protected by the First Amendment can courts fashion a right to
fair warning that fully and coherently vindicates the principles they have
identified. Part IV concludes with some brief reflections and suggestions
for future inquiry.
I. THE HISTORY OF DEMONSTRATORS' RIGHT TO FAIR WARNING
Because the textual foundations of demonstrators' right to fair
warning are unclear, any description of that right must begin with its
history. Part I analyzes that history and then attempts to delineate the
30. See infra text accompanying notes 398-399.
3 1. See infra text accompanying notes 400-402.
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basic contours of the right that has emerged. Like many other
constitutional protections, demonstrators' right to fair warning was first
recognized by the Supreme Court in a case arising from the civil rights
movement: Cox v. Louisiana.32 Part I.A discusses Cox, describing its
facts and holdings and analyzing the tensions that emerge from the
interchange between the majority and the dissent. Next, Part .B explores
how Circuit Courts of Appeals have treated Cox and the right it created.
Finally, Part I.C analyzes these precedents, distills the fundamental
characteristics of demonstrators' right to fair warning, and identifies the
questions that remain.
A. Cox v. Louisiana
Opinions describing demonstrators' right to fair warning
typically identify Cox v. Louisiana as the origin of that right.33 Cox arose
from a civil rights demonstration.34 On December 14, 1961, police
officers in Baton Rouge, Louisiana arrested twenty-three black students
from Southern University for picketing stores that had segregated lunch
counters.35 In response to those arrests, the Reverend B. Elton Cox
organized a demonstration involving approximately 2,000 students.36 On
December 15, these demonstrators proceeded from a meeting place to the
state courthouse where officers were holding the twenty-three arrested
37students. Police officers learned of the demonstration in advance, and a
number of them, including the Chief of Police, met with Cox as the
march proceeded.38 The Chief of Police instructed Cox that 'he must
32. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
33. Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 2011); Papineau v.
Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 60-61 n.6 (2d Cir. 2006); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167,
182-83 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
34. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1965) ("Cox 1"). The Supreme
Court heard two separate appeals arising from the same set of facts. Compare Cox I,
379 U.S. 536, with Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) ("Cox IX'). The Supreme
Court's second opinion did not describe the underlying facts at length, instead
referring readers to the discussion set forth in the tandem opinion. Cox II, 379 U.S.
at 560.
35. Cox I, 379 U.S. at 538.
36. Id. at 538-39.
37. Id. at 539.
38. Id. at 539-41.
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confine' the demonstration 'to the west side of the street,"' and Cox then
directed the marchers to that area, which was "across the street from the
courthouse, 101 feet from its steps.
39
Cox gave a speech in which he characterized the arrest of the
twenty-three students as "illegal.,,4' During this time, "a small crowd of
100 to 300 curious white people ... gathered on the east sidewalk and
courthouse steps. '41 Cox concluded his speech by encouraging the
gathered demonstrators to engage in the same activities for which
officers had arrested the twenty-three students.42 This remark angered
some of those who had gathered on the courthouse steps.43 The sheriff
then intervened. Addressing the marchers, he stated that, although they
had been "allowed to demonstrate" and had been "more or less
peaceful," their present actions constituted "a direct violation of the law,
a disturbance of the peace, and [needed] to be broken up immediately.,
44
Cox instructed the demonstrators to remain in place, and officers
subsequently used tear gas to disperse the march.45
Police officers arrested Cox, and a jury convicted him of three
offenses: disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and picketing
46before a courthouse. The Supreme Court's opinion in Cox dealt only
with the conviction for picketing before a courthouse. The relevant
Louisiana statute-which the State had modeled after 18 U.S.C.
§ 1507-prohibited "picket[ing] or parad[ing] in or near a building
housing a court of the State of Louisiana" with "the intent of interfering
with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice, or with the
intent of influencing any judge, juror, witness, or court officer., 47 Cox
challenged his conviction under this statute on both First Amendment
48and Due Process grounds.
The majority opinion decisively rejected Cox's challenges to the
statute. First, the Court found it unquestionable "that a State has a
39. Id. at 541.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 542.
43. Id. at 543.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 544.
46. Id. at 538, 544.
47. Cox ll, 379 U.S. at 560; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1507 (2012).
48. Cox II, 379 U.S. at 560, 566.
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legitimate interest in protecting its judicial system from the pressures
which picketing near a courthouse might create.,49 Then, characterizing
the statute as "narrowly drawn," the Court reasoned that this legitimate
state interest clearly outweighed the modest impact the statute had on
demonstrators' abilities to speak.50 Accordingly, the majority found that
the statute did not violate the First Amendment. Nor did the majority
regard the statute unduly vague, "at least as applied to a demonstration
within the sight and hearing of those in the courthouse."'" In fact, the
majority would have had great difficulty avoiding these conclusions. As
Justice Clark noted in his dissent, "Louisiana's statute ... was taken in
haec verba from... 18 U.S.C. § 1507," which "was written by members
of [the Supreme] Court after disturbances similar to the one [at issue]
occurred at buildings housing federal courts. 52
Nonetheless, the majority expressed concern over how officers
had administered the statute. In rejecting Cox's vagueness argument, the
majority recognized that "demonstrators, such as those involved here,
would justifiably tend to rely on... administrative interpretation of how
'near' the courthouse a particular demonstration might take place.",53
According to the majority, the statute itself envisioned such reliance
since it could best serve its goal of insulating judges from pressure by
entrusting its application to the discretion of officers who would observe
whether any pressure actually occurred.54 This discretion, however,
created First Amendment concerns where the statute itself had not.
Analogizing the statute to constitutionally valid restrictions on "the time,
place, duration, and manner of demonstrations," the majority noted that
officials could not use their discretion "to pick and choose among
expressions of view the ones [they] will permit to use the streets and
other public facilities.55
49. Id. at 562.
50. Id. at 562-64.
51. Id. at 568.
52. Id. at 585 (Clark, J., dissenting); see id. ("It has been said that an author is
always pleased with his own work.").
53. Id. at 568-69 (majority opinion).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 569.
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On the basis of these concerns, the majority found that Cox's
arrest violated his rights under the Due Process Clause. According to the
majority:
[A]t no time did the police recommend, or even
suggest, that the demonstration be held further
from the courthouse than it actually was. The
police admittedly had prior notice that the
demonstration was planned to be held in the
vicinity of the courthouse. They were prepared for
it at that point and so stationed themselves and
their equipment as to keep the demonstrators on the
far side of the street. As Cox approached the
vicinity of the courthouse, he was met by the Chief
of Police and other officials. At this point not only
was it not suggested that they hold their assembly
elsewhere, or disband, but they were affirmatively
told that they could hold the demonstration on the
sidewalk of the far side of the street, 101 feet from
the courthouse steps. This area was effectively
56blocked off by the police and traffic rerouted.
Given these facts, the majority concluded that sustaining Cox's
"conviction for demonstrating where [officers] told him he could 'would
be to sanction an indefensible sort of entrapment by the State-
convicting a citizen for exercising a privilege which the State had clearly
told him was available to him.'57
The majority did not, however, rely entirely on the Due Process
Clause. As the dissent observed, Cox not only engaged in conduct that
officers had explicitly permitted, but also continued to demonstrate even
after officers had ordered him to disperse. Addressing this point, the
majority noted that the sheriff had ordered the demonstrators to disperse
"not because [they were] peacefully demonstrating too near the
56. Id. at 570-71.
57. Id. ("The Due Process Clause does not permit convictions to be obtained
under such circumstances.") (citation omitted).
58. Id. at 582-83 (Black, J., dissenting).
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courthouse, nor because a time limit originally set had expired, but
because officials erroneously concluded that what [Cox] said threatened
a breach of the peace.59 According to the majority, under the First
Amendment, "this was not a valid reason for a dispersal order.,60 Thus,
Cox had not only a Due Process right to engage in conduct that officers
had permitted, but also a First Amendment right to demand that officers
61
revoke their prior permission based on legitimate reasons. In other
words, although the text of the statute complied with both the First
Amendment and the Due Process Clause, the officers' administration of
that statute ran afoul of both provisions.
Justice Black and Justice Clark, in separate dissents, each
criticized the majority for finding problems in the officers' conduct that
the majority would not ascribe to the statute itself. First, both dissenters
criticized the majority's unsubstantiated claim that the statute "foresees a
degree of on-the-spot administrative interpretation by officials charged
with responsibility for administering and enforcing it."' 62 According to
63
the dissenters, the statute clearly applied to the conduct at issue. In the
words of Justice Clark: "One hardly needed an on-the-spot
administrative decision that the demonstration was 'near' the courthouse
with the disturbance being conducted before the eyes and ringing in the
ears of court officials, police officers and citizens throughout the
,,64
courthouse. Second, because th  dissenters found the statute clear, at
least as applied to Cox, they accused the majority of impugning the well-
established principle that "a police chief cannot authorize violations of
his State's criminal laws."65 Justice Clark again provided the most
strident criticisms: "I never knew until today that a law enforcement
official ... could forgive a breach of the criminal laws. I missed that in
my law school, in my practice and for the two years while I was head of
the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.66
59. Id. at 572 (majority opinion).
60. Id. (citing Cox 1, 379 U.S. at 551, which discussed relevant First
Amendment precedents).
61. See id. at569-573.
62. Id. at 568.
63. See id. at 582 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 586 (Clark, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 586 (Clark, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 582 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black cited numerous cases for
this proposition. Id. at 582 n.5.
66. Id. at 588-89 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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Also problematic, from the dissents' perspectives, was that the
majority regarded discretion not as a tool that empowered officers to
respond flexibly to changing circumstances, but instead as a mechanism
for conferring rights on the demonstrators, and thus for imposing
additional restrictions on the police. Under typical circumstances, so long
as prosecutors and officers do not act based on certain, impermissible
considerations such as race, they have broad discretion over whether to
arrest or prosecute.6' As the dissenters noted, the officers did not need to
rely on any impermissible consideration when they changed their minds
and decided not to permit the demonstration to occur across from the
68courthouse. Instead, whereas telling demonstrators "to come no closer
to the courthouse" may have initially struck officers as the best strategy
for maintaining control over a crowd of "2,000 or more people,' 69 the
officers may have reevaluated that strategy as they became more
concerned about the crowd of observers that had gathered on the
courthouse steps.7° According to the dissenters, the majority's approach
prohibited officers from adapting their commands to developing
circumstances, requiring police either to immediately prohibit a
67. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("In our system, so
long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge
to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion....
[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal
constitutional violation so long as the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.")
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545
U.S. 748, 760-61 (2005) (describing a "well established tradition of police
discretion" and noting that "[i]t is ... simply common sense that all police officers
must use some discretion in deciding when and where to enforce city ordinances.")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
68. Cox]], 379 U.S. at 593 (White, J., dissenting in part).
69. Id. at 582 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Clark argued that any decision the
officers made occurred "in the heat of a racial demonstration in a southern city for
the sole purpose of avoiding what had the potentialities of a race riot." Id. at 588
(Clark, J., dissenting). This framing of the issue, however, ignores the peaceful
nature of the demonstration. Cox 1, 379 U.S. at 536. It also ignores the well
established principle that an audience's reaction to speech cannot justify restricting
that speech. Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1,4-5 (1949).
70. Cox 1, 379 U.S. at 543.
demonstration or to forfeit their right to do so.71 Justice Clark even went
so far as to suggest that the novel "protection" the majority had
recognized threatened the country's dedication "to freedom under law"
by empowering mobs to extract legal concessions from officers eager to
defuse fraught confrontations.
72
The majority characterized the dissenters' indignation as
unwarranted.7 3 Turning first to the argument that police officers cannot
immunize violations of statutes, the majority suggested that the Court
had "consistently recognized as necessary and permissible" a "limited
administrative regulation of traffic," and that such regulation required
that officers have a modest power to "waivef]" even statutory
requirements.74 Similarly, the majority rejected the suggestion that its
holding had meaningfully restricted police officers' ability to disperse
crowds of demonstrators:
Of course [our holding] does not mean that the
police cannot call a halt to a meeting which though
originally peaceful, becomes violent. Nor does it
mean that, under properly drafted and administered
statutes and ordinances, the authorities cannot set
reasonable time limits for assemblies related to the
policies of such laws and then order them dispersed
when these time limits are exceeded.7 5
The majority's tepid response to the dissenters' arguments
suggests that it regarded itself as holding only, and unexceptionally, that
officers enforcing statutes could not exercise discretion that the
* 76
Constitution did not permit the statutes to give.
71. Cox II, 379 U.S. at 587 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("The only way the Court
can support its finding is to... hold-as it does sub silentio-that once Cox and the
2,000 demonstrators were permitted to occupy the sidewalk they could remain
indefinitely.... This, I submit, is a complete frustration of the power of the State.").
72. Id. at 589. As described above, Justice Clark's dissent occasionally
resorted to hyperbole. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
73. See Cox 11, 379 U.S. at 569 (majority opinion).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 573.
76. Id. ("Indeed, the allowance of such unfettered discretion in the police
would itself constitute [an unconstitutional] procedure.").
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The majority's brief responses to the dissents identify some of
the limits of the right to fair warning, but they raise many questions
about both the rationale behind and the ultimate basis for the right. First,
the majority suggests that officers will have discretion to permit
otherwise illegal conduct-and thus will need to provide fair warning of
what they intend to prohibit-only where they engage in a "limited
administrative regulation of traffic. 77 Since traffic patterns may vary so
extensively that statutes cannot hope to cover all of the possibilities,
courts and legislatures alike might reasonably choose to rely on officers'
discretion in this limited context. However, the statute at issue in Cox II
did not regulate traffic. Instead, it protected the judicial system from "the
pressures which picketing near a courthouse might create.,78 Indeed, the
majority recognized a legitimate state interest in preventing the "judicial
process from being misjudged in the minds of the public," which might
attribute the outcome of cases to the "conscious[] or unconscious[]
influence[]" of demonstrators.79 In contrast to officers administering
traffic, who can perceive the costs and benefits of permitting modest
violations, officers confronting a demonstration can hardly know
whether, at some point in the future, a court may render a judgment that
"the minds of the public" will attribute to that demonstration's conscious
or unconscious influence.8 0 Thus, the majority appears not to have
explained its rationale for relying on officer discretion. Other than stating
that "it is clear that the statute . . . foresees a degree of on-the-spot
administrative interpretation"-and that such interpretation is frequently
permitted in traffic cases-the majority did not explain why the
81concededly valid and applicable statute failed to control the case.
Similarly, although the majority clarified that officers retain the
discretion to disperse demonstrators in order to prevent violence or serve
a statutory purpose, it did not explain why officers could not disperse the
demonstrators under the statute they later charged Cox with violating. A
short example illustrates this point. Officers may, and frequently do,
permit drivers to proceed through an intersection against a traffic light.
If, after receiving such permission, a driver stops in the intersection and
77. Id. at 569.
78. Id. at 562.
79. Id. at 565.
80. See id.
81. Id. at 568.
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begins demonstrating, the First Amendment surely permits an officer to
order her to disperse and, if she fails to comply, to arrest her. The reason
is simple: the officer enforces a statute that complies with the First
82Amendment. Why then could the officers in Cox not order the
demonstrators to disperse on the ground that their conduct, although
formerly permitted, potentially frustrated the statute's purpose of
maintaining judicial independence?
Instead of answering this question, the majority noted that
officials failed to rely on the statute when ordering Cox to disperse.
83
This explanation, however, is problematic, especially given that the
Court apparently based its holding on the First Amendment. First, where
officers have a legitimate basis for making arrests, courts have shown
great unwillingness to invalidate or impugn those arrests on the ground
that the officers had unlawful intentions, even when they intended to
suppress speech.84 But that is precisely what happened in Cox. Second, a
right to have officers identify the permissible reason for dispersal is not
the right to engage in "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" discourse that
the First Amendment guarantees.85 In other words, the majority's
rationale appears to limit officers' discretion without truly protecting
First Amendment rights, requiring only that arrests conform to a script.
As described above, a careful reading of the opinions in Cox
raises two important questions about the right that case recognized. First,
82. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) ("The authority of a
municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of
the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent
with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order
upon which they ultimately depend.").
83. Cox H, 379 U.S. at 572 ("He was expressly ordered to leave, not because
he was peacefully demonstrating too near the courthouse, nor because a time limit
originally set had expired, but because officials erroneously concluded that what he
said threatened a breach of the peace.").
84. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 252 (2006) (holding that a plaintiff
cannot state "an actionable [claim of retaliation under] the First Amendment without
alleging an absence of probable cause to support the underlying criminal charge");
Mozzochi v. Borden, 959 F.2d 1174, 1180 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that motive need
not be examined if "probable case to arrest existed independent of defendants'
motive"); cf Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153-54 (2004) (holding that
officer's "subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as
to which the known facts provide probable cause").
85. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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what motivated the majority's decision to focus on the officers'
enforcement of the statute, rather than the statute itself? The answer to
this question will determine when demonstrators can invoke the right to
fair warning. To put the point in somewhat circular terms, only when
courts focus on officers' actions will they inquire into whether the
officers, as opposed to the statute or regulation, provided the requisite
warning. Second, after officers permitted the relevant demonstration,
what needed to occur before they could validly arrest the demonstrators?
Answering this question will reveal the content of the right to fair
warning, i.e., what having such a right permits demonstrators to demand.
Before turning to these questions, however, the Article first examines
how Circuit Courts of Appeals have applied Cox.
B. Cox's Legacy
At least four Circuit Courts of Appeals-the Second, Seventh,
Tenth, and D.C. Circuits-have considered the right to fair warning that• 86
Cox recognized. Although each Circuit Court has confronted an
analogous set of facts and reached a similar result,87 their analyses of the• 88
right to fair warning have differed significantly. Examining these
differences will illuminate both the current extent of demonstrators' right
to fair warning-i.e., the set of propositions courts uniformly understand
Cox to entail-and the remaining questions that surround the right. This
subpart describes each Circuit Court's decision, and the following
subpart analyzes the current state of the doctrine.
86. See generally Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 2011)
(addressing claims that anti-war demonstrators' constitutional rights were violated
when they were arrested in a large protest in Chicago); Buck v. City of Albuquerque,
549 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2008) (hearing claims by protestors that their constitutional
rights were violated when police officers arrested them during a protest); Papineau v.
Parmley, 465 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2006) (deciding whether police officers had qualified
immunity in a case involving claims of excessive force against demonstrators);
Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (determining if officers violated
demonstrators' First Amendment rights when the officers arrested the demonstrators
at a protest at the United States Capitol building).
87. Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746; Buck, 549 F.3d at 1287; Papineau, 465 F.3d at 60;
Dellums, 566 F.2d at 184.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
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1. Dellums v. Powell - On May 5, 1971, approximately 2,000
demonstrators staged a protest against the Vietnam War at the United
States Capitol.89  Several United States Congressmen, including
Congressman Ronald Dellums, planned to address the demonstrators
from the steps of the capitol building.9° When the protestors arrived at
the capitol grounds, the capitol police initially stopped them, but
subsequently permitted them to enter after a discussion with
Congressman Dellums.9 1 After some period of time, however, "the police
cordoned off the bottom of the steps, prevented anyone from leaving,
and[, over the protests of Congressman Dellums,] began arresting
members of the assemblage."' 92 Congressman Dellums and a class of
demonstrators sued, and a jury found in their favor, rejecting the officers'
claims that the protest was disruptive and that the chief officer had fairly
warned the demonstrators.
93
Before the D.C. Circuit, the officers argued that they properly
arrested the demonstrators under 9 D.C. Code § 124 and 22 D.C. Code
§ 3102.94 Section 124 prohibited "parad[ing], stand[ing], or mov[ing] in
processions or assemblages in the United States Capitol Grounds,"95 and
§ 3102 forbade entering "any public or private dwelling, building or
other property . . . without lawful authority."96 In contrast to Cox,
however, the D.C. Court of Appeals had previously invalidated each
statute, as written, on First Amendment grounds.97 To save § 124 from its
constitutional defects, the D.C. Court of Appeals had imposed a limiting
instruction, under which, if officers determined that conduct was "more
89. Dellums, 566 F.2d at 173.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 174.
93. Id. at 196-97; see also id. at 206 (Leventhal, J., concurring) ("A reporter
testified that Chief Powell, after making his initial announcements, had turned to
Chief Wilson and said that he thought many people had not heard the order to leave,
and asked Wilson if he thought the order should be given again. 'No,' Wilson said,
'let them tell their story in court."').
94. Id. at 177-78 (majority opinion).
95. Id. at 177 n.12.
96. Id. at 178 n.15.
97. Id. at 179-80 (citing United States v. Nicholson, Nos. 20210-69A et al.
(D.C. Ct. of Gen. Sess. June 19, 1969), aff'd United States v. Nicholson, 263 A.2d
56 (D.C. App. 1970)).
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disruptive . . . than that normally engaged in by tourists and others
routinely permitted on the Grounds,"98 they could:
bar or . . . order from the Capitol Grounds, any
group which is noisy, violent, armed, or disorderly
in behavior, any group which has a purpose to
interfere with the processes of the Congress, . . .
[and] any group which has the effect, by its
presence, of interfering with the processes of the
Congress.
99
Although the officers argued that § 124 allowed them to arrest
demonstrators who were "more disruptive . . . than . . . tourists and
others routinely permitted on the Grounds," the D.C. Circuit concluded
that such a construction would not assuage the D.C. Court of Appeals'
constitutional concerns.00 Instead, because "it would be impossible for
anyone to tell when his otherwise constitutionally protected behavior (or
that of his group) had become 'more disruptive' than the conduct in
which others normally engaged, the officers' proposed interpretation
would have "an unconstitutional chilling effect."'' Thus, the D.C.
Circuit understood § 124, as interpreted by the D.C. Court of Appeals, to
require officers to literally "order [demonstrators] from the Capitol- . 102
Grounds" before making any arrest.
In the alternative, however, the Dellums Court held that Cox
would have required a warning even if § 124 had not. 103 According to the
Court, because "the Capitol Police had in the past allowed persons
invited to the Capitol by Members [of Congress] to come and go freely,"
98. Id. at 180 (quoting United States v. Nicholson, Nos. 20210-69A et al.
(D.C. Ct. of Gen. Sess. June 19, 1969)). The opinion for United States v. Nicholson
is attached as the Appendix to the Court's opinion in Dellums.
99. Id. at 179 (quoting United States v. Nicholson, Nos. 20210-69A et al.
(D.C.Ct. of Gen. Sess. June 19, 1969)).
100. Id. at 180.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 179, 181 ("[A]n order to quit must precede arrests under 9 D.C.
Code § 124."). Whether officer had given such a warning before arresting the
plaintiffs was a question of fact that the jury had resolved in the plaintiffs' favor. Id.
at 183-84.
103. Id. at 183.
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the officers' decision to "step[] aside on being told [that Representative
Dellums] had invited the marchers to meet with [him]" amounted to "an




In light of that unwritten permit, the Court interpreted Cox to require that
no arrest occur "until an order to disperse had been given which was
itself based on permissible considerations," i.e., considerations other than
the demonstrators' viewpoint.05 Because the facts of Dellums were "very
similar" to those of Cox, the D.C. Circuit had no occasion to consider the
constitutional origins of the right it enforced.1°6 Nonetheless, the Court
upheld the jury's determinations that officers had violated the
demonstrators' rights under both the First and Fourth Amendments,
thereby suggesting that it regarded the right to fair warning as
intertwined with those provisions.1
07
2. Papineau v. Parmley - On May 18, 1997, several dozen
members of the Onondaga Nation gathered on private property to protest
a new tax on the sale of tobacco products.'08 The demonstrators chose
that particular location for their protest in part because the property
abutted an interstate highway.10 9 In response to the demonstration,
seventy state police officers gathered, all dressed in riot gear. I0 After the
protest began, a group of demonstrators attempted to enter the interstate
highway in order to "distribute literature." These actions potentially
violated N.Y. Penal Law § 240.20(5), which prohibited "obstruct[ing]
vehicular or pedestrian traffic" with "intent to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm or recklessly creating a risk
thereof.""2 Subsequently, however, other protestors persuaded those in
the roadway to abandon their efforts." 3 After the small group of
demonstrators had rejoined the main protest, the officers formed a
"skirmish line," waited "for no more than thirty-five seconds," and then
104. Id. at 182 &n.34.
105. Id. at 183.
106. Id. at 182 n.35.
107. See id. at 176, 184, 195.
108. Papineau v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 2006).
109. Id.
110. Id. The plaintiffs' evidence suggested that some of the officers spoke of
the protestors' need "to get their asses kicked." Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at59.
113. Id. at 53.
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"charged into the demonstration."'"1 4 After reaching the protestors, the
officers allegedly "began arresting protesters . . . indiscriminately,
assaulting plaintiffs, beating them with their riot batons, dragging them
by their hair and kicking them." 5
Considering this record, the Second Circuit held that qualified
immunity would not protect the officers from the demonstrators' claims
under the First and Fourth Amendments." 6 Unlike the officers in Cox
and Dellums, the officers in Papineau did not permit any of the
demonstrators to attempt to distribute literature on a highway. 117 Instead,
because officers dispersed the protest only after the group that had
entered the highway had rejoined those who had not, the question was
"whether a reasonable police officer would have believed that he or she
could disperse the otherwise peaceable demonstration because a few
[unidentifiable] individuals within that crowd had violated the law at an
earlier time .... ,,"118 The Second Circuit, with then-Judge Sonia
Sotomayor writing for the Court, first held that the transgressions of a
few could not justify the officers' decision to disperse the entire
demonstration. '' 9
However, the Second Circuit went further, concluding that "even
if the [officers] had a lawful basis to interfere with the demonstration,"
the plaintiffs "still enjoyed First Amendment protection, and absent
imminent harm, the troopers could not simply disperse them without
giving fair warning."'120 Implicit in the requirement, the Court noted, was
an opportunity for "the ordinary citizen to conform his or her conduct to
the law.' 2 ' Thus, relying on Cox and Dellums, among other cases, the
Second Circuit effectively held that, even where officers can interfere
with a peaceful demonstration, the First Amendment entitles protestors to
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id at 60-61, 63.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 59-60.
119. Id. at 60 ("Defendants could not . . . have reasonably thought that
indiscriminate mass arrests without probable cause were lawful under these
circumstances.").
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1999)).
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a warning that will permit them to voluntarily comply with the officers'
directives. 1
22
The Second Circuit clearly grounded this right to fair warning in
the First Amendment, describing the officers' failure to warn as a
"separate First Amendment violation .. ,,23 Nonetheless, the right the
Second Circuit described differed subtly from the right recognized in
Cox and Dellums. On one hand, the Second Circuit assumed that,
because some demonstrators had acted illegally, the officers had a
legitimate basis for ordering the entire group to disperse.124 But on the
other, the majority of demonstrators had violated no statute. 25 As in Cox,
then, the demonstrators could infer from context that they engaged in
protected conduct. The basis for that inference, however, had changed.
No longer could the Court claim that protestors were "demonstrating
where [officers] told [them they] could."'126 In the absence of any
permission, reliance on a due process right against "indefensible . . .
entrapment" would have been inappropriate.127 Thus, although the
Second Circuit analogized the facts it confronted to those in Cox and
Dellums, it effectively identified a new basis for demonstrators'
justifiable belief that they acted appropriately: the demonstrators'
46 ,128"undeniable right" to engage in "peaceable protest activities."
122. Id. at 60-61 & n.6.
123. Id. at 60.
124. Id.
125. id.
126. Cox l, 379 U.S. at 571.
127. Id. (quoting Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426 (1959)).
128. Papineau, 465 F.3d at 60. As this Article went through First Amendment
Law Review's publication process, the Second Circuit issued another opinion
addressing demonstrators' right to fair warning. See Garcia v. Does, 12-2634-cv,
2014 WL 4099270 (2d Cir. Aug. 21, 2014). While time and editorial constraints
have not permitted a full incorporation of Garcia into the Article's analysis, that
case's discussion of demonstrators' right to fair warning appears broadly consistent
with the Article's fundamental thesis. Specifically, the majority approved of
Papineau's First Amendment analysis, id. at *6, and held that the right to fair
warning protected demonstrators who had received only implicit permission to
engage in the conduct for which officers later arrested them, see id. at *7 (framing
the issue as "whether a reasonable police officer (in the position of the officers who
decided to arrest plaintiffs) should have known that under the totality of the
circumstances, the conduct of the police could have been reasonably understood by
plaintiffs as an implicit invitation to enter the Bridge roadway, and thus should have
164 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
3. Buck v. City of Albuquerque - On March 20, 2003, between
five hundred and a thousand demonstrators gathered to protest the United
States' invasion of Iraq.129 Although the protestors lacked a parade
permit, they met with the Albuquerque Police Department before the
demonstration and arranged to have officers close a street.130 During the
demonstration, the crowd began "spilling over onto" adjacent streets,
causing officers to close a larger area than they had originally planned. 
131
known that additional, louder, or clearer instructions were required."). Moreover, the
majority's opinion in Garcia provoked a powerful dissent. See id. at *11-*24
(Livingston, J., dissenting). While that dissent rejects the view that demonstrators
enjoy a broad right to fair warning created by the First Amendment, in doing so, it
reinforces this Article's overarching point that courts can plausibly identify several
different constitutional bases for demonstrators' right to fair warning, each of which
would alter the right's scope. The dissent forcefully argues that appellate decisions
applying Cox have taken "a due process right (a right not to be entrapped by
government officials who expressly assure that conduct will not constitute a
violation and then seek to punish for it) and convert[ed] it into a Fourth Amendment
right not to be arrested in circumstances in which no such assurance has been
afforded ...." Id. at *19. This argument fails to appreciate the importance of the
First Amendment to the Cox Court's analysis. See infra Parts III.A. 1, III.A.2. As the
dissenters in Cox pointed out, the majority could not simply argue that officials had
"expressly assure[d]" Cox that the conduct at issue would "not constitute a
violation." See Cox II, 379 U.S. at 582-83 (Black, J., dissenting) ("I fail to
understand how the Court can justify the reversal of this conviction because of a
permission which testimony in the record denies was given, which could not have
been authoritatively given anyway, and which even if given was soon afterwards
revoked."); id. at 588 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("In view of these distinctions, I can see
no enticement or encouragement by agents of the State sufficient to establish a
Raley-type entrapment."). Moreover, the relationship between a defense against
conviction and a prohibition on arrest is simpler than the Garcia dissent suggests.
See Garcia, 2014 WL 4099270, at *8 (collecting cases for the proposition that, under
appropriate circumstances, evidence of an affirmative defense can preclude a finding
of probable cause). Nonetheless, the Garcia dissent, like the dissents in Cox,
highlights both the surprising qualities of demonstrators' right to fair warning and
the importance of this issue for officers and demonstrators alike. Id. at *24
(Livingston, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's interpretation of the right to
fair warning "makes more difficult the judicious use of discretion in policing large
crowds.").
129. Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1274 (10th Cir. 2008)
(noting that the 10th Circuit had described the relevant facts in Fogarty v. Gallegos);
Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir. 2008).
130. Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1150.
131. Id. at 1151.
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The protestors began marching down the newly closed street, and
officers eventually formed a skirmish line in order to halt the march's132
progress. After being stopped, the demonstrators returned to their
starting point.1 33 As they arrived, officers announced over a loudspeaker
system that the demonstrators should disperse. 134 Many demonstrators
testified that, because of the surrounding noise, they could not
understand officers' "garbled and unintelligible" warnings.135 When the
demonstrators did not disperse, officers fired tear gas into the crowd and
began making arrests.'
36
Buck involved several plaintiffs whom officers had arrested.
37
The officers argued that they had probable cause to believe that the
plaintiffs had violated two laws: Albuquerque's parade permit ordinance;
and section 66-7-339 of the New Mexico statutes, which prohibited
walking "along and upon" a roadway "[w]here sidewalks are
provided.'  Although the parties did not dispute that the demonstrators
had proceeded "along and upon" the streets without first obtaining a
parade permit, the Tenth Circuit noted that the officers had both closed
streets before the demonstrators reached them and "direct[ed] the
progress ... of the procession."39 The Tenth Circuit concluded that these
actions "sanctioned the protestors walking along the road and waived the
permit requirement."'40  Because officers had permitted the very
violations for which they arrested the plaintiffs, the court concluded that
132. Id. The opinion in Fogarty suggests that the demonstrators may have




135. Id. The named plaintiff in Fogarty provides an example of the type of
demonstrator hypothesized in the introduction: "Fogarty, a physician and faculty
member at [the University of New Mexico], was accompanied by his wife, a friend,
and his friend's fiancee. Fogarty observed that several streets had been closed and
assumed that police were permitting demonstrators to march in the streets. Fogarty
then joined the main group of marchers .... Id.
136. Id. at 1151-52.
137. Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1277-79 (10th Cir. 2008).
138. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-339 (2014).
139. Buck, 549 F.3d at 1283.
140. Id. at 1284. The court also suggested that officers had granted "a defacto
parade permit." Id at 1283.
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they lacked probable cause and thus had violated the plaintiffs' clearly
established rights under the Fourth Amendment."'
Although the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Buck did not cite Cox,
the reasoning applied in those two cases is strikingly similar. Each case
held that officers could not constitutionally arrest demonstrators for
conduct that the officers had permitted. But Buck goes further than Cox.
Whereas the protestors in Cox demonstrated only where officers had
explicitly permitted them to do so, the protestors in Buck exceeded the
bounds of their original agreement with police. 141 Police officers thus had
not explicitly permitted the conduct at issue in Buck, a fact that the Tenth
Circuit implicitly recognized when it stated that the officers' conduct
"may have been interpreted as . . . sanctioning . . . the
demonstration."143 Nonetheless, Buck's analysis seems to logically
extend the reasoning in Cox: demonstrators in large protests often will
not know the scope of any agreement their leaders have made with the
police and will look to officers for guidance on what is permissible.
Indeed, some of the demonstrators in question testified that they had
done precisely that.144 Yet, focusing on the officers' conduct magnifies
the concerns that the dissenters expressed in Cox. Officers may not have
voluntarily closed the streets onto which demonstrators "spill[ed]," and
may instead have waited to stop the demonstrators' progress only
145because they lacked the manpower necessary to comfortably do so.
Thus, the Tenth Circuit may have attributed to officer discretion actions
that demonstrators had effectively compelled.
4. Vodak v. City of Chicago - Like Buck, Vodak involved a
protest against the United States' 2003 invasion of Iraq. 146 On March 20,
2003, eight thousand demonstrators gathered in downtown Chicago. 14' A
city ordinance required a permit for "any march, procession or other
similar activity ... upon any public street ... which requires ... police
141. Id. at 1286.
142. Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1150-52 (10th Cir. 2008).
143. Buck, 549 F.3d at 1285 (emphasis added).
144. Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1150-51 ("Fogarty observed that several streets had
been closed and assumed that police were permitting demonstrators to march in the
streets. Fogarty then joined the main group of marchers ....
145. Id.
146. Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738, 740 (7th Cir. 2011).
147. Id. at 742.
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officers to stop or reroute vehicular traffic .... To obtain such a
permit, applicants needed to specify the date and the route of the march
and to give the city two days in which to process their applications. 49 In
Vodak, however, the demonstrators could not specify a date for their
protest because they wanted their march to coincide with the start of the
war. 50 In such situations, the "police, as a matter of uncodified practice,
[would] sometimes waive the requirement of a permit."'151
Because the demonstrators had not obtained a permit from the
city, they had not specified the exact route that their march would 
take. 51
At the beginning of the march, the organizers of the demonstration
informed the police that they intended to proceed north up one of
Chicago's major north-south arteries and then disperse.53 For unknown
reasons, however, many of the demonstrators did not proceed as far north
as the organizers had planned, and instead turned west."' The police
became concerned that the marchers' westward progression would block
another of Chicago's north-south arteries, Michigan Avenue. 55 To
prevent this, the officers formed a barricade in front of Michigan Avenue
and ordered marchers through a bullhorn not to enter that street.156 The
marchers reversed course, proceeded five blocks south past streets that
officers had barricaded, and then turned again toward Michigan Avenue
on the first street that officers had not blocked. 157 Rather than once again
commanding demonstrators not to enter Michigan Avenue, officers
blocked the march on both sides, trapping both demonstrators and
passers-by, and then made approximately nine hundred arrests. 
58
The Seventh Circuit held that these arrests violated clearly
established Fourth Amendment rights.159 According to the court, because
officers had permitted the march, but had not insisted on a specified




152. Id. at 741-42.
153. Id. at 742.




158. Id. at 740, 744.
159. Id. at 746-47.
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route such that they could expect demonstrators to know of that route,
the officers needed to warn the demonstrators not to proceed toward
Michigan Avenue before making any arrests. 16 Although officers had
attempted to provide such warnings through bull horns, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that a bull horn "was no mechanism... for conveying
a command to thousands of people stretched out [over several
blocks].' 61 Thus, this was a case in which "the police [said] to a person
go ahead and march and then, five minutes later, having revoked the
permission for the march without notice to anyone, [arrested] the person
for having marched without police permission."'
162
The Seventh Circuit found that the First Amendment played only
a "background role" in its analysis, and it characterized the
demonstrators' claims under that amendment as "largely duplicative."'
' 63
The background role to which the court referred consisted largely of
limitations on the city's permitting scheme. According to the court, the
First Amendment did not permit the city to "flatly ban groups of people
from spontaneously gathering on sidewalks or in public parks in response
to a dramatic news events," although it would not have "forbidden the
Chicago police to require of the organizers . . . a clear idea of the
intended march route, to hold them to it, and to prepare in advance
reasonable measures for preventing the demonstration from spilling over
the boundaries."'' 64 The problem, then, was simply that officers had
exercised their discretion under the First Amendment poorly, permitting
a spontaneous march without first requiring demonstrators to identify a
route on which the officers could later insist. 65
Of course, whether or not officers had required them to do so,
the demonstrators had informed the police of their planned route, and the
police had turned out "in force" along that route.166  Thus, Vodak
resembles Buck in that demonstrators' conduct exceeded the bounds of
160. Id. at 745.
161. Id. at 746.
162. Id. at 746-47.
163. Id. at 750-51.
164. Id. at 749-50.
165. See id. at 746 ("The underlying problem is the basic idiocy of a permit
system that does not allow a permit for a march to be granted if the date of the march
can't be fixed in advance, but does allow the police to waive the permit requirement
just by not prohibiting the demonstration.").
166. Id. at 742-43.
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what officers might have understood themselves to authorize. Much like
in Buck, where the Tenth Circuit found that officers had, by their
conduct, implicitly permitted the march's expansion, the Seventh Circuit
in Vodak faulted the officers for not clearly delineating the scope of what
they would allow.167 In effect, by explicitly permitting something
uncertain, the police had effectively permitted anything they could not
emphatically proscribe at a later time. Nonetheless, whether officers'
previous insistence on a particular route would have justified the arrests
in question is unclear. The Seventh Circuit did not explain why a route
that organizers had announced to officers was less likely to be known to
8,000 demonstrators than one that organizers had announced and on
which officers had insisted. Moreover, that subtle difference has nothing
to do with many of the states of mind that the Seventh Circuit attributed
to the arrestees. According to the court, many arrestees may have
"simply decided that [the planned route] was too long a walk," "others
may simply have been following the crowd, thinking that it either was a
proper route for the march or a way out," and still others "weren't part of
the march but were just trying to get home."'' 68 Official insistence on a
particular route, then, arguably would not have weakened the arrestees'
claims of innocence.
C. The Contours of Demonstrators' Right to Fair Warning
Despite the basic similarities between Cox, Dellums, Papineau,
Buck, and Vodak, these cases differ significantly in their analyses of
arrests of protestors. Specifically, whereas Dellums and Papineau
meaningfully incorporate the First Amendment into their analysis, Buck
and Vodak do not. Moreover, while Papineau, Buck, and Vodak each
subtly broaden the right recognized in Cox, each does so differently:
Papineau identifies a new situation in which officers must warn
demonstrators, Buck predicates the need for warning on officers' grant of
implicit permission, and Vodak interprets officers to have permitted
everything they did not explicitly forbid. Distilling these disparate cases
into a set of rules or principles is not an easy task. Nonetheless,
undertaking that task will help courts determine sensible boundaries for
167. Id. at 746, 750.
168. Id. at 743-45.
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the right to fair warning in the many situations that the future may
present. Section C contains two parts. The first identifies the set of
principles on which agreement exists among all the courts to have
considered the right to fair warning. The second attempts to pose the
questions that courts have not yet resolved, questions on which the
remainder of the article will focus.
1. Points of agreement - Despite their differences, each of the
cases discussed above shares basic similarities, and these similarities
delineate the fundamental contours of the right to fair warning. First,
each of the cases dealt with a statute or ordinance that raised difficult
First Amendment questions, yet also promoted a legitimate governmental
interest.169 The most obvious example is Dellums, in which a court had
previously held that the relevant statute violated the First Amendment,
but had attempted to give that statute a saving construction that would
allow officers to vindicate its underlying purpose. 17 The statutes at issue
in the remaining cases also implicated First Amendment rights, as the
courts deciding those cases frequently acknowledged.17 1 For example, at
least one Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that the First
Amendment prohibits statutes from imposing strict liability for parading
without a permit, exactly what the legislative schemes at issue in Vodak
169. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged in Cox that the relevant
conduct was "intertwined with expression and association," it took great pains to
emphasize the validity of the statute in question, which several of its members had
written. Cox I1, 379 U.S. at 563-64. Nonetheless, the Court applied a less exacting
standard of First Amendment review in Cox than it had in previous cases involving
similar statutes. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1963)
("[F]reedom of speech ... is ... protected against censorship or punishment, unless
shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that
rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest .... There is no room
under our Constitution for a more restrictive view.") (quoting Terminiello v. City of
Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949)). Many contemporary commentators noticed the shift in
the Court's analysis. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox
v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 9 (1965). Moreover, the Court has since rejected
the argument that a legislature may restrict speech near courthouses in order to
prevent members of the public from believing that lobbying affected courts'
decisions. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183 (1983).
170. Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
171. Vodak, 639 F.3d at 749-50.
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and Buck did.1 Similarly, the Supreme Court has frequently emphasized
that the First Amendment protects a wide array of expressive activity
from prosecution under statutes that criminalize breach of the peace or
disorderly conduct, precisely the type of statute at issue in Papineau.1
7 3
Notwithstanding the fact that these statutes raised First Amendment
concerns, however, each also promoted a governmental interest that theS .. 174
Supreme Court has recognized as legitimate. Moreover, narrower
tailoring might not have prevented the statutes at issue from implicating
First Amendment rights."' Thus, the courts in each of the cases
described above might have reasonably feared that the conflict at issue
pitted demonstrators' First Amendment rights against a legislative
scheme that narrowly pursued legitimate interests.
Second, in each case other than Papineau, officers permitted the
demonstrators to engage in at least some of the relevant conduct.
176
Given that each of the statutes at issue implicated demonstrators' First
Amendment rights, the officers' grants of permission suggest that they
understood that the demonstrators might engage in protected conduct.
While the officers' motivations are unclear, as a matter of factual record,
the courts considering their conduct noted the potential effect First
Amendment considerations may have had on the officers' actions. 177
Indeed, in both Vodak and Dellums, the officers had adopted unwritten
practices for enforcing the relevant statutes in situations that presented
172. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. City of Dearborn, 418 F.3d
600, 613 (6th Cir. 2005). See Vodak, 639 F.3d at 741; Buck v. City of Albuquerque,
549 F.3d 1269, 1283 (10th Cir. 2008).
173. Edwards, 372 U.S. at 235-38. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26
(1971); Papineau v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 59 (2d Cir. 2006).
174. See Cox 11, 379 U.S. at 574.
175. See Vodak, 639 F.3d at 741 ("[W]hen a march is planned for the unknown
date of some triggering event, ... even two days' notice is infeasible .... "); id. at
749 (requiring legislatures to permit people to "spontaneously gather[] on sidewalks
or in public parks in response to a dramatic news event").
176. See Cox 11, 379 U.S. at 571; Vodak, 639 F.3d at 741; Buck, 549 F.3d at
1283; Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
177. See Vodak, 639 F.3d at 741 ("[W]hen a march is planned for the unknown
date of some triggering event, so that even two days' notice is infeasible, the police,
as a matter of uncodified practice, will sometimes waive the requirement of a
permit."); id. at 749 (requiring legislatures to permit people to "spontaneously
gather[] on sidewalks or in public parks in response to a dramatic news event"); id
at 751 (noting that the First Amendment played a "background role" in the case).
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First Amendment concerns.78 In light of the First Amendment concerns
at issue, the officers granting permission may not have simply exercised
their discretion to allow proscribed conduct, and may instead have
acknowledged and complied with legal constraints on their ability to
enforce those proscriptions. Moreover, even assuming that officers had
discretion over whether to permit the relevant conduct, the fact that they
had granted permission suggested to the courts that they had initially
resolved the apparent conflict between the purposes of the relevant
statutes, on the one hand, and the demonstrators' rights, on the other, in
favor of the demonstrators.
Third, in each of the cases described above, the court
emphasized the demonstrators' states of mind. 9  The analysis of
demonstrators' states of mind, moreover, focused not upon the mens rea
requirements of the statutes officers sought to enforce, but instead upon
demonstrators' understandings of either the permission that officers had
extended or the limitations that officers sought to impose.18° Two of the
courts quoted Cox's prohibition on "convicting a citizen for exercising a
privilege which the State had clearly told him was available to him."1 8'
178. See id. at 741 ("[W]hen a march is planned for the unknown date of some
triggering event, so that even two days' notice is infeasible, the police, as a matter of
uncodified practice, will sometimes waive the requirement of a permit."); Dellums,
566 F.2d at 178 ("[S]tandard practice at the Capitol would be for [dispersal] orders
to be given because it was the experience of the Capitol Police that many people
were not aware of the statutes governing conduct at the Capitol and would, upon
being notified of a potential violation, bring their conduct into line with the law.");
id. at 182 n.34 ("[A]ny plaintiff familiar with precedents of administration of the
Capitol Grounds statute could reasonably have concluded that 'permits' had been
issued, since the Capitol Police had in the past allowed persons invited to the Capitol
by Members to come and go freely.").
179. Cox 11, 379 U.S. at 571; Vodak, 639 F.3d at 745 ("[Demonstrators] may
simply have been following the crowd, thinking that it either was a proper route for
the march or a way out."); Buck, 549 F.3d at 1283 ("[A]ny action by APD officers
acquiescing to an unplanned march could reasonably have been interpreted as a
waiver of the parade permit requirement."); Papineau v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 60
(2d Cir. 2006) (noting that demonstrators must know the relevant law and have an
opportunity to conform to it); Dellums, 566 F.2d at 182 n.34 ("[A]ny plaintiff
familiar with precedents of administration of the Capitol Grounds statute could
reasonably have concluded that 'permits' had been issued .... ).
180. Cox 11, 379 U.S. at 571; Vodak, 639 F.3d at 745-46; Buck, 549 F.3d at
1283; Papineau, 465 F.3d at 60; Dellums, 566 F.2d at 182 n.34.
181. Vodak, 639 F.3d at 747; Dellums, 566 F.2d at 182.
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In contrast, the other two focused on what demonstrators could haveS182
reasonably understood about officers' commands. Finally, at least two
courts expressed concern that bystanders and passers-by might have. 183
innocently joined or become caught up in the relevant demonstrations.
Thus, each court, independently of the statute at issue, expressed concern
about whether the arrestees could have reasonably understood that they
engaged in conduct that the officers intended to prosecute.
Finally, when assessing the demonstrators' states of mind,
several courts concluded that the actions or culpability of some would
not justify the arrests of many. 84 Of course, certain types of conduct are
so clearly illegal that they permit officers to impute criminal intentions to• 185
a large group of people. But where, as in the cases described above,
demonstrators might misapprehend the boundary between the
permissible and the impermissible, courts have exercised great care to
prohibit officers from enforcing the statutes at issue too broadly. 86
The four similarities discussed above reveal the fundamental
contours of the right to fair warning. Specifically, where statutes or
ordinances impose legitimate restrictions that nonetheless implicate
demonstrators' First Amendment rights, courts will examine not only
182. Buck, 549 F.3d at 1283; Papineau, 465 F.3d at 60.
183. See Vodak, 639 F.3d at 744 ("The police then began culling the trapped
herd, arresting marchers along with people who weren't part of the march but were
just trying to get home .... ); Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir.
2008) (discussing the case of a passerby who joined a demonstration after
"observ[ing] that several streets had been closed and assum[ing] that police were
permitting demonstrators to march in the streets.").
184. Vodak, 639 F.3d at 745 ("Maybe the marchers ... should have guessed
that it was a forbidden route as well, and no doubt some did, but others may simply
have been following the crowd."); Papineau, 465 F.3d at 60 ("[P]laintiffs had an
undeniable right to continue their peaceable protest activities, even when some in the
demonstration might have transgressed the law."); Dellums, 566 F.2d at 177, 183
(requiring officers to believe that "plaintiffs as a group were violating the law")
(emphasis added).
185. See Cox II, 379 U.S. at 574 ("Nothing we have said here ... is to be
interpreted as sanctioning riotous conduct in any form .... "); Carr v. District of
Columbia, 587 F.3d 401, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Papineau, 465 F.3d at 60 (noting
that, where demonstrators threaten "imminent harm," officers need not provide fair
warning).
186. Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746 ("[T]here was no mechanism.., for conveying a
command to thousands of people .... ).
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whether arrestees violated those provisions, but also whether the
underlying circumstances would allow demonstrators to reasonably
believe that they had engaged in legal conduct. If courts find that
demonstrators reasonably, yet mistakenly, believed that they acted
legally-either because officers permitted certain conduct or because
only a small number of individuals transgressed the relevant
prohibitions-then courts will analyze whether officers effectively
dispelled that mistaken belief before making arrests. To dispel a
reasonable, yet mistaken belief, however, police officers cannot
communicate their demands only to a small fraction of demonstrators.
Instead, officers must take measures to ensure that those they subject to
penalties have each received the relevant warning. Thus, where
circumstances raise questions about how certain, problematic statutes
apply to demonstrators, the right to fair warning requires officers to
provide individualized notice of what the law requires before they arrest
demonstrators for engaging in conduct that the demonstrators may
reasonably believe is innocent. 187
2. Unanswered Questions - The outline of the right to fair
warning described above raises as many questions as it answers. Most
importantly, as described above, the courts that have vindicated the right
to fair warning have attributed that right to different sources. Whereas
Cox described the right as one of due process, Vodak grounded the right
in the Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable arrests, and
Papineau characterized it as an extension of demonstrators' right to
peacefully protest.' Each potential basis would change the scope of the
right. Thus, understanding the right to fair warning requires determining
exactly which constitutional provision creates that right.
Next, analysis of appellate decisions has not answered the two
questions raised by Cox. First, when and why do courts focus on officers'
exercise of their discretion, rather than the statute that officers seek to
enforce? Undoubtedly, the appellate cases clarify when courts will take
187. Although only Papineau discussed this question, the right to fair notice
likely also requires that officers provide demonstrators with an opportunity "to
conform [their] conduct to the law." Papineau, 465 F.3d at 60 (quoting City of Chi.
v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1999)).
188. Compare Cox II, 379 U.S. at 571, with Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746, and
Papineau, 465 F.3d at 60.
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this approach. In each of the cases described above, including Cox,'89 the
court did so when the statute at issue implicated First Amendment rights.
Nonetheless, the mere fact that courts shift their focus in such cases does
not explain why they do so. Accordingly, the explanation for the
analytical turn that the dissent in Cox found so troubling remains to be
seen. Second, and similarly, the appellate decisions have not clarified the
circumstances under which officers who have granted permission may
revoke it and when, if ever, the officers may base such revocation on the
statute that they have permitted demonstrators to violate.
Finally, the court of appeals decisions raise two additional
questions about whether the right to fair warning applies more broadly
than the Supreme Court recognized in Cox. First, does the right to fair
warning apply not only where officers have explicitly permitted
demonstrators to engage in certain conduct, as in Cox, but also where
officers have done so implicitly, as in Buck and Vodak? Second, can
demonstrators reasonably believe that they do not violate the law only
when, as in Cox, they have received permission from officers charged
with enforcing the law, or did Papineau appropriately recognize that
demonstrators' could form such a belief based on the fact that they
exercised their "undeniable right" to peacefully protest?1 90 As described
below, the answers to these questions depend upon the origins of the
right to fair warning. Accordingly, with these questions in mind, the
Article now shifts to an examination of each of the potential bases.
II. THE ORIGINS OF DEMONSTRATORS' RIGHT TO FAIR WARNING
The foregoing discussion suggests that the right to fair warning,
while intuitively compelling, remains underdeveloped from a theoretical
perspective. Most importantly, courts have not clearly identified the
constitutional origin of the right to fair warning. Part II analyzes the three
obvious candidates for that origin: the Due Process Clause, the Fourth
Amendment, and the First Amendment. Each subpart examines one of
these provisions in turn: Part II.A considers the Due Process Clause, Part
II.B the Fourth Amendment, and Part II.C the First Amendment. After
describing the doctrine that has developed under the relevant
189. See Cox 11, 379 U.S. at 574.
190. Papineau, 465 F.3d at 60.
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constitutional provision, each subpart examines, first, why that provision
might provide a plausible explanation for demonstrators' right to fair
warning and, second, the potential problems that might result from
attributing the right to that provision.
A. The Due Process Clause
When the Supreme Court first recognized demonstrators' right to
fair warning in Cox, it referred specifically to the "Due Process Clause"
and to a line of jurisprudence it had developed under that provision.
19I
The Due Process Clause protects any "person" from deprivation of "life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."'192 In the context of
criminal prosecutions, which implicate citizens' liberty interests, due
process requires that a government provide "fair warning ... in language
that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a
certain line is passed."' 93 "The underlying principle is that no man shall
be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed."194 Ordinarily, a legislature provides the
necessary fair warning simply by enacting a statute, publishing it, and
giving those affected a reasonable opportunity to conform their conduct
to it.,95
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has identified three related
circumstances in which the existence of a statute alone does not provide
fair warning.196 "First, the vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of 'a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application."1 9 7 Second, "the canon of strict
construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning
by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to
191. Coxll,379 U.S.at 571.
192. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
193. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
194. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964) (quoting United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
195. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 108 (1985).
196. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).
197. Id. (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
[Vol. 13
RIGHT TO FAIR WARNING
conduct clearly covered.' ' 98 Finally, "due process bars courts from
applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither
the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within
its scope."1 99 Courts considering vagueness challenges apply a more
exacting standard of review where a statute curtails the exercise of
200constitutional rights, including First Amendment rights. In such
circumstances, courts seek to ensure not only that the statute has
adequately warned the accused about the illegality of her conduct, but
also that the statute has not, by its vagueness, frustrated the exercise of
constitutional rights by forcing individuals to avoid a wider swath of
potentially covered conduct than the statute can legitimately proscribe.
201
Building on these principles, the Supreme Court has further
recognized that the actions of officials may create uncertainty about a
statute's application, thereby depriving individuals of fair warning. In
Raley v. Ohio, 2 the precedent on which Cox relied, the Supreme Court
considered a case concerning four Ohio residents who had appeared to
testify about "subversive activities" before the state's "Un-American
Activities Commission.,20 3 During the course of their testimony, the
Commission's chairman advised the witnesses that, if they believed their
testimony would incriminate them, they could invoke Ohio's
204constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Following the
witnesses' invocation of that privilege, however, the State indicted them
for failing to answer, and the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) ("Regardless of whether
the CDA is so vague that it violates the Fifth Amendment, the many ambiguities
concerning the scope of its coverage render it problematic for purposes of the First
Amendment."); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 391 (1979) (finding lack of
notice especially problematic "where the uncertainty induced . . . threatens to inhibit
the exercise of constitutionally protected rights"); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402
U.S. 611, 615 (1971) ("But the vice of the ordinance lies not alone in its violation of
the due process standard of vagueness. The ordinance also violates the constitutional
right of free assembly and association.").
201. Reno, 521 U.S. at 871-72; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108-09 (1972).
202. 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
203. Id. at 424-27.
204. Id. at 429-32.
2014]
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 13
205
privilege did not protect them from criminal conviction. Considering
this sequence of events, the Supreme Court found a violation of the Due
Process Clause. Specifically, the Court concluded that, "[a]fter the
Commission, speaking for the State, acted as it did, to sustain the Ohio
Supreme Court's judgment would be to sanction an indefensible sort of
entrapment by the State-convicting a citizen for exercising a privilege
which the State had clearly told him was available to him.",206 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court invoked the Due Process Clause's prohibition
against convictions under "vague" or "[i]nexplicably contradictory"
207statutes. But it also regarded the retraction of the immunity defense as
a more troubling violation of the Due Process Clause, finding that it
involved "active misleading.,
208
The due process defense recognized in Raley appears to have the
following characteristics. First, the Court's holding implies that whoever
invokes the defense must show that the relevant official "sp[oke] for the
State" and "clearly told" the defendant that her actions were
209permissible. Second, because the Due Process Clause prohibits
conviction only where a defendant cannot "reasonably understand" that
210she has violated the law, those who hope to rely on official instructions
must show that they had no reasonable basis for doubting that the
requirements discussed above were met. Finally, because "the purpose of
the fair notice requirement is to enable the ordinary citizen to conform
his or her conduct to the law,",211 officials may prevent further reliance on
their mistaken instructions by correcting those instructions and giving
individuals a reasonable opportunity to conform their conduct to the
newly disclosed requirements.
As described above, Raley's due process defense resembles the
defense recognized in Model Penal Code § 2.04(3)(b)(iv). Under that
provision, a "belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is
a defense" so long as an individual "acts in reasonable reliance upon an
official statement of the law ... contained in... an official interpretation
205. Id. at 432-34.
206. Id. at 425-26.
207. Id. at 438.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 425-26.
210. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
211. City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1999).
of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for the
interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the
,,2 12offense. In exploring the contours of the defense from Raley, courts
have frequently analogized that defense to the one recognized in the
Model Penal Code. Courts doing so have generally concluded that the
official who offers the interpretation on which a defendant hopes to rely
must actually possess, rather than merely appear to possess, the
213responsibility described by the Code. Similarly, courts have held that a
defendant may not rely on statements that an officer has made to others,
rather than to the defendant herself.2 4 Thus, the analogy to Model Penal
Code § 2.04(3)(b)(iv) has reinforced the narrowness of Raley's
requirements that an official "speak[] for the State" and "clearly t[ell]"
defendants that a privilege is available.1 5 To qualify for the defense,
defendants must obtain personal guarantees about the legality of
questionable conduct, and they must carefully distinguish those with
apparent authority from those with actual authority, trusting only the
latter.
The cases vindicating demonstrators' rights to fair warning
provide several reasons to believe that the Due Process Clause creates
that right. First and foremost, as noted above, Cox specifically cited to
the Raley defense when first recognizing demonstrators' right to fair• 216
warning. More generally, in several of the cases discussed,
212. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b)(iv) (2014).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez-Gonzalez, 184 F.3d 1160, 1167-68
(10th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e hold that the defense of entrapment by estoppel requires that
the 'government agent' be a government official or agency responsible for
interpreting, administering, or enforcing the law defining the offense." (collecting
cases)). Nonetheless, at least one judge has required instead that an official only
appear to the defendant to have interpretive authority. See United States v. Barker,
546 F.2d 940, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("[A] citizen should have a legal defense to a
criminal charge arising out of an unlawful arrest or search which he has aided in the
reasonable belief that the individual who solicited his assistance was a duly
authorized officer of the law."). The majority of circuit courts have rejected Judge
Wilkey's rationale. See, e.g., United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 757-58 & n.7 (3d
Cir. 1999) (collecting cases).
214. See United States v. Eaton, 179 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) ("For a
statement to trigger an entrapment-by-estoppel defense, it must be made directly to
the defendant, not to others.").
215. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 425-26 (1959).
216. Coxll,379U.S.at571.
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demonstrators relied on the instructions of police officers who bore
"responsibility for the... enforcement of the law defining the offense,"
and thus could arguably give an authoritative interpretation of the law
under Model Penal Code § 2.04(3)(b)(iv).2 17 For example, in Vodak, the
police department could "waive" the requirement of a parade permit.2 18
Similarly, in Dellums, the Capitol Police had generated "precedents of
administration" for "the Capitol Grounds statute.,219 Thus, police officers
frequently administer the traffic regulations that restrict demonstrators'
ability to protest, and this fact provides the foundation necessary for
demonstrators to reasonably rely on officers' commands as "official
statement[s] of the law,' ' 22 which give rise to a due process defense.
Second, demonstrators' reliance on on-the-spot instructions by
police officers often implicates the Due Process Clause's vagueness
concerns. For example, in Dellums, a court had previously invalidated
the statute at issue-which largely banned parading on the Capitol
Grounds-as unduly vague because the officers administering the statute
had the power to suspend its prohibitions.222 According to the Dellums
Court, the power of suspension prevented demonstrators from "knowing
whether they might be in violation of the law. .. except by... inquiries
to . . . members of the Capitol Police Force.,223 Officers have had a
217. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b)(iv) (2014); Cox 11, 379 U.S. at 571
("[T]he highest police officials of the city, in the presence of the Sheriff and Mayor,
in effect told the demonstrators that they could meet where they did."); Vodak v.
City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738, 741 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that police officers could
"waive the requirement of a permit"); Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269,
1284 (10th Cir. 2008) (same); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 182 n.34 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (noting that officers could issue "permits" and had in fact created "precedents
of administration" governing the issuance of permits). But see Pitt, 193 F.3d at 757-
58 & n.7 ("[T]he use of the defense of public authority [is limited] to those situations
where the government agent in fact had the authority to empower the defendant to
perform the acts in question").
218. Vodak, 639 F.3d at 741.
219. Dellums, 566 F.2d at 182 n.34.
220. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b)(iv) (2014).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 196-201.
222. Dellums, 566 F.2d at 177 n.12, 179-80.
223. Id. at 179.
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similar ability to suspend parade permit requirements in several of the
cases that have protected demonstrators' rights to fair warning.2
24
Thus, in these cases, as in Dellums, ambiguity exists as to what
conduct an ordinance covers, 22 and demonstrators cannot determine
what that ordinance prohibits without asking the officers charged with
enforcing it. In Dellums, the D.C. Circuit concluded that, in order to
overcome the statute's vagueness problem, officers had to issue "an
order to quit" before making any arrests.226 In other words, because only
the officers could dispel the underlying vagueness problem, the court
asked not whether the officers had clearly told demonstrators that they
could engage in the underlying conduct, but instead whether officers had
clearly told them they could not. While such an approach does not
straightforwardly apply the Raley defense invoked in Cox, it recognizes a
more fundamental due process problem: namely, the fact that
demonstrators cannot reasonably discern what the law requires before
they have received the benefit of an official interpretation.
Finally, the fact that the cases recognizing demonstrators' right
to fair warning all implicate First Amendment rights may only sharpen,
rather than displace, the inquiry under the Due Process Clause.227 Where
litigants challenge a statute that restricts First Amendment rights on
vagueness grounds, the Supreme Court has described First Amendment
228concerns as "related" to those raised by the Due Process Clause. When
reviewing such challenges, a court seeks not only to ensure notice-a
core due process concern-but also to avoid chilling the exercise of
224. See Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738, 741 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he
police, as a matter of uncodified practice, will sometimes waive the requirement of a
permit."); Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1283 (10th Cir. 2008)
(finding that officers, by closing streets and "directing the procession," had
"essentially" granted "a defacto parade permit"). Cf Cox 11, 379 U.S. at 571 ("[T]he
highest police officials of the city, in the presence of the Sheriff and Mayor, in effect
told the demonstrators that they could meet where they did.").
225. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).
226. Dellums, 566 F.2d at 181.
227. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 391 (1979) (finding lack of notice
especially problematic "where the uncertainty induced ... threatens to inhibit the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights"); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) ("Third, but related, where a vague statute abut[s] upon
sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise
of [those] freedoms.") (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).
228. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109.
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"basic First Amendment freedoms.",229 Thus, courts' attention to the First
Amendment concerns raised by parade-permitting schemes might
indicate only that they apply a heightened form of due process review
that incorporates First Amendment principles. Thus, the Due Process
Clause could very plausibly provide the basis for the right to fair
warning.
Nonetheless, the Due Process Clause cannot explain everything
about the right to fair warning that courts have attributed to
demonstrators. First, the Due Process Clause provides little insight into
why the Supreme Court disregarded the Sheriffs dispersal order in
Cox. 23 Because the Court had rejected Cox's vagueness challenge to the
Louisiana statute, resting its holding instead on Cox's defense under
231
Raley, the Sheriff's dispersal order should have precluded Cox from
prevailing. In effect, far from telling Cox that he could demonstrate, the
dispersal order "clearly told" Cox that he could not, revoking officers'
232
earlier permission and reinstating the statute's normal operation. The
Supreme Court's stated reason for disregarding the dispersal order-
namely, that the Sheriff had not expressed a "valid reason" for that
order:-does not resonate with the concerns that animate due process
23
review. As described above, the Due Process Clause prohibits holding
229. Id. For a discussion of the Court's concern with chilling the exercise of
First Amendment rights, see infra text accompanying notes 295-301. In Grayned,
the Court also identified the prevention of "arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement" as a concern that pertained to the Due Process analysis. Grayned, 408
U.S. at 108. But the Supreme Court has also associated that concern with review
under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Cox 1, 379 U.S. at 557. Thus, both the First
Amendment and the Due Process clause protect individuals against "arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
230. Cox II, 379 U.S. at 572.
231. Id. at 568, 571.
232. Id. at 571. The dissenters regarded this point as dispositive:
Here the demonstration was permitted to proceed for the
period of time that the demonstrators had requested. When
they were asked to disband, Cox twice refused. If he could
refuse at this point I think he could refuse at any later time as
well. But in my view at some point the authorities were
entitled to apply the statute and to clear the streets. That point
was reached here.
Id. at 593 (White, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 572 (majority opinion).
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someone "criminally responsible for conduct which he could not
reasonably understand to be proscribed;' '234 it does not entitle a person
who has that understanding, based on both the statute and the instructions
of the officer charged with enforcing it, to an account of how their
235
prosecution "[]relate[s] to any policy" of the statute. Moreover,
although the Supreme Court has stated that the Due Process Clause
forbids "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,,236 reviewing the
officers' stated reasons for revoking permission, as the Court did in Cox,
regulates only the appearance of such enforcement. Where demonstrators
have a mere right to hear a valid reason for their dispersal, little will
prevent officers from engaging in precisely the discrimination that the
Due Process Clause forbids.2 3 7 Finally, the Cox Court did not engage in
the most basic aspects of a discrimination analysis, asking neither
whether officers had treated others differently,238 nor whether the
purpose the Court had attributed to the statute provided a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the officers' actions. Thus, whatever
motivated the Court to disregard the Sheriffs dispersal order in Cox, that
decision appears to have had little to do with the Court's invocation of
the Due Process Clause.
Similarly, later decisions invoking Cox have applied neither
vagueness review nor the review required by Raley and its progeny. For
example, rather than closely examining whether officers enforcing
permitting schemes may truly "speak[] for the State," an important
element of the Raley defense, these courts often simply assume that the
239
officers can and do. In Buck, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "the
officers' conduct essentially amounted to the grant of a de facto parade
permit," without discussing whether officers had any authority to make
234. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964) (quoting United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
235. Cox 11, 379 U.S. at 573.
236. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
237. Cf supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
238. Cf Cox II, 379 U.S. at 581 (Black, J., dissenting) (comparing statute's
treatment of labor unions to its treatment of other groups).
239. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426 (1959). See also United States v. Pitt,
193 F.3d 751, 757-58 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding that "the use of the defense
of public authority [is limited] to those situations where the government agent in fact
had the authority to empower the defendant o perform the acts in question").
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240
such a grant, either by their conduct or otherwise. Similarly, in Vodak,
the Seventh Circuit found that officers could waive the permit
requirement "as a matter of uncodified practice," which consisted
entirely "in not telling the demonstrators that they need[ed] 
a permit."241
In such circumstances, courts risk extending the Raley defense too far.
The mere fact that officers enforce a statute or regulation cannot
empower them to suspend it.242 Instead, as commentators have argued,
the availability of the Raley defense must urn on legislative intent, the
likelihood that the relevant official has carefully studied the scope and
effect of a particular law, and the degree to which that official can be
held accountable for authorizing otherwise unlawful conduct.243 As
described above, however, the cases recognizing demonstrators' right to
fair warning have not considered these complicated questions, suggesting
that, if they apply the Raley defense, they do so only superficially.
244
More importantly, however, the courts considering
demonstrators' right to fair warning have turned Raley's second
requirement on its head, asking not whether officers "clearly told"
demonstrators that they could march, but instead whether they clearly
told them they could not. One cannot explain court decisions on the basis
that officers' conduct rendered the underlying regulatory regime
245
vague. No court appears to have held that an officer's decision not to
enforce a legal provision can render that provision vague under the Due
240. Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1283 (10th Cir. 2008).
241. Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738, 741 (7th Cir. 2011).
242. Cf Pitt, 193 F.3d at 758 ("[O]nly the Director of Customs and the
Director of the Drug Enforcement Agency, in conjunction with the approval of the
United States Attorney for the subject district, could sanction and authorize the type
of conduct in which Pitt and Strube engaged with respect to the charged 468
kilograms of cocaine.").
243. See generally Stephen M. Kristovich, Comment, United States v. Barker:
Misapplication of the Reliance on an Official Interpretation of the Law Defense, 66
CALIF. L. REV. 809, 830 (1978). Of course, in the wake of Monell v. Dep 't of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), few municipalities will likely send high-ranking
officials to oversee a demonstration. In Garcia v. Bloomberg, for example, the
plaintiffs had great difficulty alleging the Police Commissioner's personal
participation in arresting demonstrators. See Garcia v. Bloomberg, 865 F. Supp. 2d
478, 493-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (dismissing Monell claims), aff'd sub nom. Garcia v.
Does, 12-2634-cv, 2014 WL 4099270 (2d Cir. Aug. 21, 2014).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 232-235.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 221-226.
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Process Clause, and for good reason: such a holding would conflict with
the "deep-rooted" tradition of "law-enforcement discretion.' 246 Indeed,
as the Supreme Court noted, "[i]t is ... simply 'common sense that all
police officers must use some discretion in deciding when and where to
enforce city ordinances.'247 If the decision not to enforce rendered
enforcement constitutionally impermissible, then officers would have no
discretion over "when ... to enforce city ordinances 248  situations
where, because of "insufficient resources" or "sheer physical
impossibility," officers could not make an initial arrest, enforcement
249
discretion would be eliminated altogether.
Furthermore, if a lack of enforcement generates constitutional
protection, then demonstrators can confer rights on themselves and each
250
other, a result that is difficult to explain under the Due Process Clause.
In Vodak, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that some demonstrators
may not have received any instructions from officers, and instead were
"simply... following the crowd.,251 In Buck, the fact that demonstrators
"spill[ed] over onto" adjacent crosswalks forced officers to close more
streets than they had originally planned, which in turn permitted
252
demonstrators to "flood[] into" new areas. These examples
demonstrate that, if officers need not give explicit permission to trigger
demonstrators' rights, then the existence of constitutional protection will
246. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2005).
247. Id. (quoting City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 62 n. 13 (1999)).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 760 (quoting 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 1-4.5,
commentary, pp. 1-124 to 1-125 (2d ed. 1980)).
250. United States v. Eaton, 179 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) ("The
defense applies only when an official tells a defendant hat certain conduct is legal.")
(internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, this result is precisely what the
dissenters in Cox feared. Cf Cox II, 379 U.S. at 588 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("Here the
demonstrators were determined to go to the courthouse regardless of what the
officials told them regarding the legality of their acts. Here, like the one petitioner in
Raley whose conviction was affirmed by an equally divided Court, appellant never
relied on the advice or determination of the officer.").
251. Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738, 745 (7th Cir. 2011).
252. Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008). See also Buck
v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1274 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that the 10th
Circuit had described the relevant facts in Fogarty v. Gallegos).
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depend on informational dynamics that officers cannot control.253 The
concern that individuals may misinterpret commands given to third
parties has led courts to apply the Raley defense only when permission is
,,254given "directly to the defendant. One court has even warned that a
different approach would "eviscerate the long-standing notion that
ignorance of the law is no defense to a crime" since reasonable mistakes
about officers' interactions with others abound.255 Thus, courts
construing demonstrators' right to fair warning have consistently
regarded that right as broader than the due process right they have
recognized in other circumstances.
Finally, the Due Process Clause cannot explain the Second
Circuit's decision in Papineau v. Parmley.256 In Papineau, the officers
257did not give any instructions to the demonstrators. Nor did the Second
Circuit characterize the statute at issue, which prohibited obstructing
258
traffic, as vague. Rather, the court reasoned that officers had to give
fair warning before dispersing the demonstrators because those
demonstrators "had an undeniable right to continue their peaceable
protest activities, even when some in the demonstration might have
transgressed the law. 259 In other words, while the demonstrators in
Papineau had the requisite belief in the legality of their conduct, that
belief originated not from uncertainty about what the law required, but
instead from the First Amendment's protections, which required
solicitude even where officers had a valid basis for arresting some
members of the group. Thus, while the Due Process Clause provides a
plausible basis for some aspects of the right to fair warning, it fails to
explain others, raising questions about whether it motivates the decisions
courts have reached.
253. Cf Bert I. Huang, Shallow Signals, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2227, 2230 (2013)
(describing how individuals may mistakenly believe that others act legally and
imitate them, leading to a "spread of misconduct").
254. Eaton, 179 F.3d at 1332.
255. Id.
256. 465 F.3d 46, 60-61 (2d Cir. 2006).
257. Id. at 52-53.
258. See id. at 59-60.
259. Id. at 60.
B. The Fourth Amendment
In contrast to Cox, which invalidated a criminal conviction,
subsequent cases have considered demonstrators' right to fair warning in
the context of § 1983 claims alleging that officers had violated the Fourth
Amendment by arresting demonstrators. Under the Fourth Amendment,
an officer may arrest a suspect without first obtaining a warrant only if
the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed
or is about to commit a crime.260 An officer has probable cause when,
viewing "the events leading up to the arrest ... from the standpoint of
an objectively reasonable police officer," there is a "reasonable ground
for the belief of guilt.' '261 That belief of guilt, however, must be
"particularized with respect to the person to be... seized.,
262
Because the Fourth Amendment governs whether or not officers
can arrest demonstrators, courts considering demonstrators' § 1983
claims for false arrest will invoke the Fourth Amendment regardless of
whether that provision provides the basis for the right to fair warning..As
a result, the question of whether the Fourth Amendment creates the right
to fair warning differs from the question of whether courts invoke the
Fourth Amendment when prohibiting the arrest of demonstrators who
have not received fair warning. To answer the former question, we must
ask whether the requirement that officers have probable cause creates the
need for fair warning in cases like those discussed here.
At least two courts have perceived a connection between the
requirement of probable cause and the need for fair warning.263 In both
cases, the courts noted that police officers had discretion to waive the
permit requirements they sought to enforce and had in fact granted such a
260. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004).
261. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
262. Id. at 371. Because courts view the circumstances from the perspective of
a reasonable officer, the arresting officer's state of mind "is irrelevant to the
existence of probable cause," and the offense an officer identifies when making an
arrest need not be the offense that a reasonable officer would suspect. Devenpeck,
543 U.S. at 153-54.
263. See generally Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 2011); Buck
v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2008).
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waiver.264 Because police officers could waive these requirements, the
crime of parading without a permit effectively had an unwritten element:
the absence of a waiver from police officers. In order to have probable
cause to arrest demonstrators for parading without a permit, officers
needed to have a reasonable basis for believing that this unwritten
element had been satisfied. Thus, where officers had previously granted a
waiver, they could not have particularized probable cause with respect to
a large group of demonstrators until they had provided demonstrators
with adequate notice of the revocation of that waiver. A different
approach would allow officers to arrest demonstrators simply because
the officers had changed their minds, a result the Seventh Circuit found
utterly unacceptable in Vodak:
No precedent should be necessary ... to establish
that the Fourth Amendment does not permit the
police to say to a person go ahead and march and
then, five minutes later, having revoked the
permission for the march without notice to anyone,
arrest the person for having marched without police
265
permission.
Thus, according to this reasoning, the right to fair warning
originated from the Fourth Amendment because officers needed to
provide fair warning before they could have probable cause to believe
that they had not waived the permit requirement.
This rationale, while persuasive, nonetheless raises many
difficult questions that might lead other reviewing courts to reject it.
First, the courts that have propounded this rationale have neither
explained why police officers can grant waivers nor examined what
procedures they must employ when doing so. Thus, skeptics might
reasonably ask why these courts have excepted the parade-permitting
ordinances at issue from the general rule that officers may not suspend
264. Vodak, 639 F.3d at 741; Buck, 549 F.3d at 1283 ("[O]fficers' conduct
essentially amounted to the grant of a defacto parade permit, as the officers would
have been aware.").
265. Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746-47. See also Buck, 549 F.3d at 1283-84.
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the criminal law and that the failure to initially enforce an ordinance does
not deprive officers of the discretion to do so later.
Moreover, the courts that ground the right to fair warning in the
Fourth Amendment have derived the standards they apply from other
legal provisions. Officers comply with the Fourth Amendment whenever
they enforce a specific criminal statute or ordinance in a reasonable
manner. The reasonableness of failing to provide a warning depends not
on the Fourth Amendment, but instead on the content of the underlying
266statute. Thus, even courts that ground the right to fair warning in the
Fourth Amendment look to other sources when determining what that
right entails. Vodak illustrates this point. While the Seventh Circuit
argued that officers had revoked permission without notice, the officers
arguably had not permitted demonstrators to depart from the organizers'
"intended route," and the arrests in fact occurred far away from that
267route. The Seventh Circuit did not address whether, under the Fourth
Amendment, the officers could have reasonably concluded that they had
not permitted the conduct for which they arrested the demonstrators.
Instead, the court inferred broad permission from the fact that officers
had not insisted that demonstrators adhere to the intended route "as aS ,,268
condition of waiving the permit requirement. But the need for officers
to impose such conditions derived from the interplay between the First
Amendment, which required officers to permit spontaneous marches, and
the parade-permitting ordinance, which empowered the officers to take
269
measures to regulate traffic. Thus, the Seventh Circuit effectively
270
understood the word "permission" as a term of art, construing it not in
light of the Fourth Amendment's touchstone of reasonableness, but
instead based on the interplay between a specific statutory scheme and
the First Amendment.
266. Cf United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943) (interpreting a
statute to criminalize conduct even though "consciousness of wrongdoing be totally
wanting").
267. Vodak, 639 F.3d at 742-43, 746-47.
268. Id. at 750.
269. See id. at 749-50 (noting that, although the ordinance cannot "flatly ban
groups of people from spontaneously gathering ... in response to a dramatic news
event," it does permit officers to "hold" demonstrators to an "intended march route"
as "a condition of waiving the permit requirement").
270. See supra text accompanying notes 163-165.
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If the underlying ordinance governs the reasonableness of an
arrest, then the considerations that have led courts to imply an
"uncodified" exception to the ordinance should also impose the
requirement of fair warning.171 Vodak again provides a good example.
On its face, Vodak might be interpreted to suggest that the officers
needed to provide warnings only because they had previously permitted
the relevant conduct.17' As noted above, however, the Seventh Circuit
understood permission in light of First Amendment principles. A close
analysis of the decision reveals that this understanding of permission
essentially incorporated the concept of fair warning. According to the
Seventh Circuit, officers could avoid granting permission only if they
both insisted on a particular route and "prepare[d] in advance reasonable
measures for preventing the demonstration from spilling over the
boundaries of the authorized march.,273 In other words, officers had
granted permission by failing to take sufficient steps to ensure that
demonstrators understood what was forbidden. In contrast to a focus on
factors that demonstrators could not perceive, such as negotiations
between officers and organizers, the Seventh Circuit's approach ensured
that officers provided a warning to those demonstrators the court
characterized as innocent-i.e., those who "simply decided that [the
planned route] was too long a walk," those who were "simply . . .
following the crowd," and those who "weren't part of the march but were
just trying to get home.,
274
The breadth of the Seventh Circuit's understanding of
permission rebuts the contention that officers needed to provide fair
warning only because they had previously granted permission. Instead,
they needed to provide fair warning-either prior to or during the
march-in order to avoid granting permission. Indeed, the Seventh
Circuit's examples of innocent arrestees suggest that the court fashioned
its definition of permission based on the need it perceived for adequate
warning. As described above, the Seventh Circuit's broad understanding
of permission derived from the competing requirements of the First
271. Vodak, 639 F.3d at 741.
272. Id. at 746-47 (faulting the police for "having revoked the permission ...
without notice to anyone").
273. Id. at 750.
274. Id. at 743-45. The Tenth Circuit has discussed similar examples. See
supra notes 129, 135.
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.. 275Amendment and the parade-permitting ordinance. By implication,
then, the concept of fair warning incorporated into that understanding of
permission also derives from those same, competing requirements. Thus,
the "background role" the Seventh Circuit attributed to the First
Amendment-i.e., the fact that the First Amendment required the
alteration of the parade-permitting ordinance at issue-permeated the
entirety of the court's analysis, informing even the concept of "notice"
that the court ascribed to the Fourth Amendment.276
C. The First Amendment
All of the cases in which courts have protected the right to fair
warning have involved statutes or ordinances that implicate
demonstrators' right to communicate their views in public fora. The
Supreme Court has long recognized that "streets and parks . . . have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
,,277
between citizens, and discussing public questions. Nonetheless, the
right to communicate in the streets is "relative," rather than "absolute,"
and legislatures may regulate it to promote "peace," "good order,"
"comfort," and "convenience.278 Legislatures may not, however, "in the
guise of regulation," "abridge[]" or "den[y]" First Amendment rights.279
In general, courts permit legislatures to regulate demonstrators'
access to the streets through nondiscriminatory limitations on the "time,
280
place and manner" of demonstrations. In the words of Henry Kalven,
time, place, and manner restrictions are justified by "the unbeatable
proposition that you cannot have two parades on the same comer at the
same time.,,281 Exactly what level of scrutiny the Supreme Court applies
to time, place, and manner restrictions is unclear. While the Court has
275. See supra text accompanying notes 268-269.
276. Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746-47, 751.
277. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). For a
historical account of how the American public used the streets following the
founding, see Tabatha Abu EI-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 543,554-69 (2009).
278. Hague, 307 U.S. at 516.
279. Id.
280. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941).
281. Kalven, supra note 169, at 25.
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characterized the government's ability to impose such a "prior restraint"
on speech in public fora as "very limited,",281 it has recognized a great
number of governmental interests that may justify time, place, and• . 283
manner restrictions. Furthermore, although the Court has required
legislatures to narrowly tailor time, place, and manner restrictions to the
governmental interests they promote, it has clarified that a prohibition
"need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of'
accomplishing a legitimate purpose, but instead will pass muster so long
as the legitimizing purpose "would be achieved less effectively absent
the regulation.,
284
The Supreme Court has further held that time, place, and manner
restrictions must "'leave open ample alternative channels ofS • ,,,285
communication. Courts have not fully resolved what this entails for
public demonstrations, but many have recognized that "[s]taged
demonstrations-capable of attracting national or regional attention in
the press and broadcast media-are for better or worse a major vehicle
by which those who wish to express dissent can create a forum in which,. ,,286
their views may be brought to the attention of a mass audience. Given
the importance of demonstrations, courts have consistently concluded
that ordinances requiring parade permits-although generally
287permissible as time, place, and manner restrictions -must include an
exception for spontaneous demonstrations that respond to emerging
282. Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992); United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
283. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989) (protecting
against "excessive noise"); Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984) ("eliminating visual clutter"); Cox I, 379 U.S. at 574
(permitting legislatures to "protect the community against disorder, regulate traffic,
[and] safeguard legitimate interests in private and public property"); see also
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 242-65
(2007).
284. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-99 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S.
675, 689 (1985)).
285. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
286. Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also id. ("It is
facile to suggest that no damage is done when a demonstration is broken up ...
simply because ... the demonstration might be held at another day or time.").
287. Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322-23 (2002).
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288events. The courts imposing this requirement reason that, because
demonstrations often seek to attract immediate attention to
contemporaneous developments, even short delays may leave only
inadequate alternative channels of communication. 9 Based on these
concerns, many local governments have endeavored, either formally or
informally, to incorporate exceptions for spontaneous demonstrations
290into their permitting schemes. Thus, even though statutes may
288. See Church of Am. Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. City of Gary, 334 F.3d
676, 682 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[A] very long period of advance notice with no exception
for spontaneous demonstrations unreasonably limits free speech."); see also Sullivan
v. City of Augusta, 511 F.3d 16, 38 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Notice periods restrict
spontaneous free expression and assembly rights safeguarded in the First
Amendment."); Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. City of Dearborn, 418
F.3d 600, 605 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Any notice period is a substantial inhibition on
speech."); Douglas v. Brownell, 88 F.3d 1511, 1523-24 (8th Cir. 1996) ("We are
convinced, however, that the five-day notice requirement is not narrowly tailored.");
NAACP v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1355 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he delay
inherent in advance notice requirements inhibits speech. By requiring advance
notice, the government outlaws spontaneous expression."). Cf Boardley v. U.S.
Dep't of Interior, 615 F.3d 508, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (invalidating a permitting
scheme that "effectively forb[a]d[e] spontaneous peech" by small groups).
289. See City of Gary, 334 F.3d at 682 ("A group that had wanted to hold a
rally to protest the U.S. invasion of Iraq and had applied for a permit from the City
of Gary on the first day of the war would have found that the war had ended before
the demonstration was authorized."); see also City of Augusta, 511 F.3d at 38
("People may, in some cases, wish to engage in street marches in quick response-to
topical events. While even in such time-sensitive situations, a municipality may
require some short period of advance notice[,] ... the period can be no longer than
necessary to meet the City's urgent and essential needs."); City of Richmond, 743
F.3d at 1356 ("[S]imple delay may permanently vitiate the expressive content of a
demonstration. A spontaneous parade expressing a viewpoint on a topical issue will
almost inevitably attract more participants and more press attention, and generate
more emotion, than the 'same' parade 20 days later. The later parade can never be
the same. Where spontaneity is part of the message, dissemination delayed is
dissemination denied.").
290. See FORT WAYNE, IND., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 101.03(D) (1996) ("This
chapter shall not apply to .. . [s]pontaneous events occasioned by news or affairs
coming into public knowledge within three days of such public assembly, provided
that the organizer thereof gives written notice to the city at least 24 hours prior to
such public assembly."); Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica,
450 F.3d 1022, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Santa Monica's spontaneous events exception
provides that '[s]pontaneous events which are occasioned by news or affairs coming
into public knowledge less than forty-eight hours prior to such event may be
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generally restrict the time, place, and manner of demonstrations, the First
Amendment's guarantee of "ample alternative channels of
communication" forecloses any absolute prohibition on protestors'
ability to speak here and now.
Laws criminalizing disorderly conduct also implicate First
Amendment rights. In the words of the Supreme Court: "[A] function of
free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger. ',291 Accordingly, the hostile reaction of a crowd to demonstrators'
unpopular views cannot render demonstrators guilty of disorderly
conduct.'92 Moreover, even where disorderly conduct statutes focus on
the obstruction of traffic, rather than on speech, courts endeavor to
ensure that the statutes circumscribe officers' discretion and do not,,293
through their vagueness, permit discriminatory enforcement. For
example, a statute cannot allow officers to permit some demonstrators to
obstruct traffic unless it contains detailed standards that apply equally to
294all. Thus, because protected speech so often confronts and challenges
listeners, the First Amendment requires disorderly conduct statutes to
operate neutrally, clearly, and within narrow boundaries.
In applying the substantive law described above, courts often
consider how statutes affect not only the particular litigants before them,
but also others who engage in indisputably protected conduct. This
approach, called overbreadth review, originates from an understanding
that a "statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to
conducted on the lawn of City Hall without the organizers first having to obtain a
Community Event Permit."') (quoting local ordinance); City of Dearborn, 418 F.3d
at 612 ("Other cities such as Omaha, Nebraska, exempt spontaneous political
demonstrations entirely from their parade ordinances.").
291. Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
292. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1963) (citing
Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4-5).
293. Cox 1, 379 U.S. at 555-57.
294. Id. Courts' treatment of parade-permit requirements strongly suggests that
a complete ban on the obstruction of traffic, with no exception for expressive
conduct, would violate the First Amendment. See supra text accompanying notes
285-290.
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1 ,295
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. When a
statute is overbroad, courts need not attempt to foresee every type of
legitimate speech that it may "chill," and can instead strike the statute
down in its entirety.296 Because overbreadth review permits litigants to
seek the complete invalidation of a statute based on its unconstitutional
application to others, it constitutes a departure both from "traditional
rules of standing," which require each plaintiff to demonstrate personal
injury, and from "traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication,"
which require a court to consider only the particular circumstances
before it. 297 In light of these departures, courts have characterized
overbreadth review as "strong medicine," using it "sparingly and only as
a last resort.', 298 For a court to apply overbreadth review, the potential for
unconstitutional application of a statute to third parties "must not only be
real, but substantial as well." 2 9 9 Moreover, when the parties challenging a
statute themselves engage in protected conduct, courts retain their
discretion to apply a limiting construction, declaring the statute "invalid
295. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). Some scholars,
including Professor Henry Paul Monaghan, argue that overbreadth review, rather
than shielding third parties from impermissible deterrence, protects litigants' right to
"insist on the application of a constitutionally valid rule." Monaghan, supra note 19,
at 4; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J.
853, 867 (1991) (describing the differences between two prevailing theories of
overbreadth). The scholarly dispute over the origins of overbreadth review does not,
however, change the analysis of whether the First Amendment creates
demonstrators' right to fair warning. Monaghan's understanding of overbreadth
review acknowledges that courts must consider other potential applications of a law
when determining whether that law is "constitutionally valid." Monaghan, supra
note 19, at 9-10. Moreover, Monaghan argues that First Amendment concerns
require increased scrutiny of such applications by limiting courts' abilities to sever
problematic legislative provisions from permissible ones. Fallon, supra, at 871-72.
Thus, according to either understanding, First Amendment overbreadth review
requires probing analysis of a law's application to potentially protected conduct. To
the extent that courts conduct a similar analysis when protecting demonstrators' right
to fair warning, see infra text accompanying notes 309-312, they suggest that First
Amendment principles inform that right.
296. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002).
297. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 563 (1992) (requiring that "the party seeking review be himself among the
injured") (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972)).
298. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
299. ld. at 615.
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to the extent that it reaches too far, but otherwise [leaving it] intact.,
300
Thus, while overbreadth review provides courts with a strong tool to
deploy in defense of First Amendment values, courts often seek to avoid
using it precisely because of its strength. Both the Supreme Court and
lower courts have subjected time, place, and manner requirements and
other restrictions on demonstrators to overbreadth review.
30'
Numerous considerations potentially indicate that, when courts
enforce the right to fair warning, they consciously or unconsciously
invoke the First Amendment. First, a concern over vagueness and
unbounded officer discretion is critical to the inquiry under both the First
Amendment and the right to fair warning. The First Amendment requires
time, place, and manner restrictions to prescribe "narrow, objective, and
definite standards" for the officials charged with applying them.302 Such
standards prevent officials from discriminating based on the content of
speech, and thus from effectively acting as censors.303 Moreover, as the
Supreme Court has made clear, vague standards inhibit free speech by
forcing demonstrators to avoid areas of legal uncertainty and "restrict[]
their conduct to that which is unquestionably safe. 30 4 Thus, definite
standards both prevent content-based discrimination and permit
demonstrators to confidently exercise the full scope of their First
Amendment rights.
The right to fair warning also prevents censorship and promotes
transparency. First, where officers have the discretion to permit or forbid
demonstrations-and can even change their minds-the danger arises
that they may discriminate based on the content of speech. The
possibility of such discrimination generates a need for courts to impose
narrow, objective standards on officers. Thus, in Cox, a dispersal order
that was "unrelated to any policy of [the relevant] statutes" did not
provide demonstrators with the necessary free warning.305 In the words
300. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985).
301. See Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129-30
(1992); Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612-13; Cox 1, 379 U.S. at 551; Seattle Affiliate of
Oct. 22nd Coal. to Stop Police Brutality, Repression & Criminalization of a
Generation v. City of Seattle, 550 F.3d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 2008).
302. Forsyth Cnty., 505 U.S. at 130-31 (quoting Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969)).
303. id.
304. Baggett v. Bullit, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
305. Cox 11, 379 U.S. at 573.
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of the Court, "the allowance of such unfettered discretion in the police
would itself constitute a procedure" that violated the First Amendment.
30
6
Similarly, in Dellums, the D.C. Circuit required a dispersal order to
precede any arrest because officers' "contradictory and uncertain"
administrative precedents had created a vagueness problem.30 7 In the
absence of a dispersal order, "it would be impossible for anyone to tell
when his otherwise constitutionally protected behavior (or that of his• • .., 308
group) had become" impermissible. These two examples indicate that,
when courts review officer conduct to ensure fair warning, they focus on
the same concerns-specifically, limiting officer discretion and
promoting transparency-that animate their First Amendment review of
statutes. This similarity between the two forms of review plausibly
suggests that the right to fair warning simply extends First Amendment
protections into a novel context.
Second, courts enforcing the right to fair warning exhibit the
same concern for the protection of potentially innocent conduct as courts
engaged in overbreadth review. As described above, courts applying
such review worry that broadly worded statutes will deter demonstrators
from engaging in expressive conduct that the First Amendment
protects. 30 9 This concern causes courts to review the application of the
statute to hypothetical individuals who are not parties and whose cases,
as a result of the statute's deterrent effect, may never arise.31 0 Courts
enforcing the right to fair warning also frequently hypothesize the
existence of undeniably innocent demonstrators in the process of
explaining why the demonstrators before the court had not received the
requisite warning. For example, in Vodak, the Seventh Circuit supposed
that some of the demonstrators whom officers had arrested "may simply
have been following the crowd, thinking that it either was a proper route
for the march or a way out," and that still others "weren't part of the
306. Id.
307. Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
308. id.
309. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) ("[Tlhe statute's very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression.").
310. Dellums, 556 F.2d at 181.
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march but were just trying to get home.' '311 Moreover, because the
plaintiffs purported to bring class actions, the potentially innocent
demonstrators to whom the courts referred could eventually become
parties. Nonetheless, the courts' reasoning bears a striking resemblance
to overbreadth review: where officers have potentially arrested many
who did not receive a warning, courts will regard the warnings in their
entirety as insufficient.312 This focus on the hypothetically, rather than
the demonstrably, innocent-which courts adopt even at the expense of
allowing potentially unmeritorious cases to proceed-suggests that
courts enforcing the right to fair warning worry about the deterrence of
protected conduct. Such a concern most plausibly originates from the
First Amendment.
Finally, the same First Amendment considerations that require
local governments to permit demonstrators to access the streets
presumably apply with no less force to officers' and demonstrators'
interactions in the streets. As described above, numerous courts have
held that the First Amendment requires local parade-permitting schemes
313to permit spontaneous demonstrations. A right to enter the streets
would mean little, however, if officers enforcing traffic and disorderly
conduct ordinances could immediately direct demonstrators to leave.
Thus, the right to fair warning might apply the same restrictions to
officers that the First Amendment applies to statutes and ordinances.
This component of the right to fair warning potentially explains why
311. Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738, 744-45 (7th Cir. 2011). Similarly, in
Buck v. City ofAlbuquerque, the Tenth Circuit found that the officers' actions "could
reasonably have been interpreted as a waiver of the parade permit requirement,"
without asking whether those before the court had so interpreted those actions. Buck
v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1283 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Fogarty v.
Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008) (discussing the case of a passerby
who joined a demonstration after "observ[ing] that several streets had been closed
and assum[ing] that police were permitting demonstrators to march in the streets").
Finally, in Dellums, the D.C. Circuit inferred official permission from the fact that
"any plaintiff familiar with precedents of administration of the Capitol Grounds
statute could reasonably have concluded that 'permits' had been issued." Dellums,
566 F.2d at 182 n.34.
312. See Vodak, 639 F.3d at 745 ("Maybe the marchers . . . should have
guessed that it was a forbidden route as well, and no doubt some did, but others may
simply have been following the crowd, thinking that it either was a proper route for
the march or a way out.").
313. See supra notes 285-290 and accompanying text.
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officers must not only warn demonstrators of their orders, but must also
base those orders on a "valid reason" that is independent from
enforcement of the underlying statute or ordinance.3 14 Simply put, if the
officers' grant of permission resolves a problem with the underlying
statute, then the statute cannot justify revocation of that grant without
recreating the original problem. Thus, one might reasonably conclude
that First Amendment concerns animate courts' articulation of the right
to fair warning, rendering the right to fair warning a First Amendment
right.
Nonetheless, many other considerations suggest that the First
Amendment does not provide the basis for demonstrators' right to fair
warning. First, if the right to fair warning protects demonstrators only
from the "indefensible sort of entrapment" described in Cox, then the fact
that courts often vindicate this right in cases involving protected
315 316expression may be entirely coincidental. In fact, as described above,
the Supreme Court first discussed "indefensible . .. entrapment" in a
case that did not consider First Amendment rights, but instead the
applicability of a state's constitutional privilege against self-.... 317
incrimination. Thus, demonstrators may receive only the same
protection from entrapment that all people enjoy, whether or not they
engage in protected speech.3'8 Because the right presumably always has
the same constitutional foundation, its application in the absence of
protected expression precludes the First Amendment from providing that
foundation.
A second, related consideration bolsters this reasoning: where
courts protect demonstrators' right to fair warning, the First Amendment
may "play[] only a background role."3 19 Even if the First Amendment has
shaped the legal provisions at issue in a case, courts considering the right
to fair warning may nonetheless ask only how officers have applied those
314. Cox 11, 379 U.S. at 572. See also id. at 573 (holding that "the allowance
of ... unfettered discretion in the police would itself constitute a procedure" that
violated the First Amendment).
315. Id. at 571.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 202-208.
317. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 425-26 (1959).
318. For example, if a non-demonstrator was told by an officer that she could
jaywalk, and then was arrested for jaywalking, a court surely would not permit a
conviction and would instead find a rights violation.
319. Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738, 751 (7th Cir. 2011).
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provisions. In other words, the mere fact that the First Amendment
provides boundaries for the legal provision that officers enforce does not
ensure that the First Amendment constrains officers' enforcement of it.
For example, in Vodak, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the First
Amendment did not require officers to permit the march in the manner
they had. 32 Thus, the requirement that officers clearly revoke that
permission may have arisen not from the First Amendment, but instead
from the officers' course of conduct: the fact that they had declared the
parade legal, as the permitting scheme allowed them to do, required them
to clearly announce their later decision to treat it as illegal. As the
Seventh Circuit reasoned, allowing officers to change their decision
about the legality of the parade without notifying demonstrators would
amount to "entrapment."'32 1 But the fact that officers had such discretion
as a result of First Amendment considerations was merely part of the
"background," playing no meaningful role in the analysis.
The First Amendment's background role in the cases discussed
above may explain why courts so often discuss the right to fair warning
in cases that involve protected expression. Specifically, because traffic
regulations frequently raise difficult First Amendment questions,
legislatures may often rely on officers to ensure that those regulations
322
sweep narrowly and respect demonstrators' legitimate interests. In
other words, courts might often consider the right to fair warning in cases
involving protected speech not because the First Amendment requires
officers to give warning, but instead because the First Amendment
320. Id. at 750 ("Nothing in either the First Amendment or local law would
have forbidden the Chicago police to require of the organizers, as a condition of
waiving the permit requirement in order to allow a demonstration on a date as yet
uncertain, a clear idea of the intended march route, to hold them to it, and to prepare
in advance reasonable measures for preventing the demonstration from spilling over
the boundaries of the authorized march.").
321. Id. at 746-47.
322. See Garcia v. Bloomberg, 865 F. Supp. 2d 478, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
("[B]ecause of the tension between First Amendment protections and local laws
aimed at preventing disruption, difficult questions frequently arise as to the
applicability to protest marchers and demonstrators of laws that require parade
permits or that criminalize disruption of the peace. As a result, 'fair warning as to
what is illegal' often comes not from the legislative bodies that draft the potentially
relevant laws, but instead from the executive officials who enforce them."), aff'd sub
nom. Garcia v. Does, 764 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2014).
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creates exception-ridden legal schemes that require officers to make
determinations about legality, thereby creating the need for warning. Yet,
the fact that the First Amendment helped to produce the underlying
circumstances does not ensure that it plays a meaningful role in the
relevant legal analysis.
Finally, the First Amendment may not provide the constitutional
foundation of the right to fair warning simply because, in the relevant
context, it does not require much. As described above, a parade-
permitting scheme "need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive
means of' accomplishing a legislature's purpose, and instead must only
"promote[] a substantial government interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation.323 Moreover, courts generally will not
consider the abstract interests of non-litigants except in cases of
"substantial" overbreadth.324 Combining these two doctrines, one might
conclude that time, place, and manner regulations will trigger exacting
scrutiny only where they restrict substantially more conduct than
necessary to most effectively accomplish one of the many governmental
325purposes that can legitimate such regulations. Thus, so long as -a
permitting scheme does not discriminate based on the content of
326speech, the First Amendment may require only that the scheme make
some good faith attempt to maintain "'ample alternative channels of
327communication."' Given that the First Amendment places only weak
constraints on the laws a legislature may adopt, expecting it to impose
further limitations on officers' enforcement of those laws may make little
sense.
Thus, the First Amendment, like the Due Process Clause and the
Fourth Amendment, provides a plausible, yet potentially problematic
323. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 (1989) (quoting
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
324. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
325. See supra note 283.
326. Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133-34 (1992).
327. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). For example, courts
have upheld permitting schemes that limit spontaneous demonstrations to one
location. Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022,
1045-46 (9th Cir. 2006); see also El-Haj, supra note 277, at 550-54 (describing the
"significant ways" in which "local officials may shape protests" by imposing time,
place, and manner requirements).
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basis for demonstrators' constitutional right to fair warning. Having
discussed why each provision might and might not create the right,
analysis now turns to identifying the constitutional provision that best
explains the contours of existing doctrine.
III. LOCATING THE RIGHT TO FAIR WARNING
Although all of the constitutional provisions examined above
potentially provide a basis for the right to fair warning, substantial
arguments suggest that each does not. Part III first attempts to determine
which potential basis most persuasively explains existing doctrine. Then,
it begins the process of articulating what the basis of the right to fair
warning entails for its scope. Part III.A endeavors to locate the right's
basis by returning to the questions set forth in Part I.328 Asking whether
the principles attributed to the Due Process Clause, the Fourth
Amendment, and the First Amendment provide satisfactory answers to
those questions, Part III.A concludes that only the principles associated
with the First Amendment can. Next, Part III.B reexamines the
arguments against identifying the First Amendment as the basis for theS329
right to fair warning, discussing why those arguments, although
significant, should not ultimately persuade courts. Finally, Part III.C
examines the scope of the right that emerges from the proposed
interpretation of existing doctrine. Ultimately, courts should focus on
whether demonstrators have received fair warning when an ordinance
infringes First Amendment rights, but cannot easily be narrowed. To
detennine whether demonstrators have received fair warning, courts
should focus on two considerations: whether officers' actions will deter
demonstrators from engaging in protected conduct; and whether officers
have exercised their discretion in a manner that might permit them to
discriminate based on viewpoint.
A. Unanswered Questions
The review of existing doctrine undertaken in Part I generated
numerous questions. Having described courts' interpretations of the Due
328. See supra text accompanying notes 188-190.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 315-327.
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Process Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and the First Amendment, we
can now determine whether those interpretations provide any answers. In
fact, the preceding discussions have already suggested some of the
answers set forth below. This Part considers each of Part I's questions in
turn and concludes that First Amendment doctrines provide the most
satisfactory answers. In short, only the First Amendment's concern for
fostering "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" discourse can justify
courts' focus on how officers enforce laws and generate coherent
standards for determining what officers must do to make a valid arrest.
330
1. When and Why Do Courts Focus on Officers' Exercise of
Their Discretion? - Cox and its progeny all raise a similar question:
why do the courts considering the right to fair warning scrutinize how
officers have enforced a valid statute, departing in certain respects from
the tradition of judicial deference to officer discretion?33 1 Existing First
Amendment doctrine provides a potential answer: the statutes at issue
raise First Amendment problems that the available First Amendment
remedies cannot satisfactorily resolve. As noted above, courts have
consistently held that the First Amendment creates a right to
spontaneously demonstrate in response to current events.33' Both parade-
permitting ordinances and bans on interfering with traffic ostensibly
prohibit such demonstrations. Thus, even though courts have recognized
that such ordinances serve legitimate purposes,333 a straightforward First
Amendment analysis-particularly one that, like overbreadth review,
considers the statutes' effects on hypothetical third parties-apparently
requires their invalidation. But what would invalidation of such
ordinances accomplish? If courts seek to permit spontaneous
demonstrations, then one might wonder whether any ordinance can
articulate standards that provide the necessary flexibility. As the Seventh
Circuit explained in Vodak, "when a march is planned for the unknown
date of some triggering event, . . . even two days' notice is infeasible.,
334
Thus, revised ordinances may not cure the problems courts seek to
330. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 246-249.
332. See supra notes 288-290.
333. See Cox II, 379 U.S. at 574 (permitting "properly drawn statutes" that
"regulate traffic").
334. Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738, 741 (7th Cir. 2011).
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address, and invalidating existing ordinances could only frustrate the
legislature's legitimate interest in regulating traffic.
The inability of First Amendment remedies to satisfactorily
resolve the problem that courts confront indicates that courts require a
narrower standard of review. The right to fair warning provides that
standard. By focusing attention on the officer's enforcement of an
ordinance, the right to fair warning allows courts both to protect
demonstrators' ability to spontaneously protest and to preserve the
legislature's ability to pursue its legitimate interests. As the Supreme
Court reasoned in Cox, permitting officers to exercise "a degree of on-
the-spot administrative interpretation" allows them, and the courts that
review them, to conduct a more nuanced balancing of the competing
interests than a legislature could in the abstract.335 Thus, existing First
Amendment doctrine suggests that courts will examine whether officers
have provided fair warning when, although a statute raises First
Amendment problems, the traditional remedy of invalidation proves
unsatisfactory.
Although courts have never explained their decisions in these
terms, a close reading of the relevant cases suggests that they have
unconsciously adopted this approach. While the majority in Cox did not
consider the possibility of a narrower statute, it almost certainly
confronted a problematic statute that i felt compelled to uphold. As
noted above, the statute at issue in Cox largely copied a federal statute
that Supreme Court Justices had drafted in order to protect their own1. . 336
court from disruptions. Invalidating the statute would thus have
required the Court both to find fault with its prior work and to undermine
one of the safeguards of its own repose. This conflict of interest suggests
that the Court had a motive to apply a lax standard of review, and
contemporaneous commentators claimed that the Court had done exactly
that, contrasting the standard of review applied in Cox with that applied
in Edwards v. South Carolina.337 Nonetheless, focusing on officers'
enforcement of the statute allowed the Court to effectively protect Cox's
First Amendment rights without impugning the statute's validity."'
335. Cox H, 379 U.S. at 568-69.
336. See supra text accompanying note 52.
337. See Kalven, supra note 169, at 9; see also supra note 169.
338. For a discussion of how the Court's focus on officer discretion vindicated
Cox's First Amendment rights, see infra text accompanying notes 353-354.
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Thus, Cox appears to have been a historical accident: the Supreme
Court's unique unwillingness to invalidate a statute on First Amendment
grounds led it to develop an alternative mechanism for vindicating First
Amendment concerns, albeit sub silentio.
Circuit Courts of Appeals have availed themselves of the
mechanism Cox created, adapting it to the new circumstances described
above. Nowhere is this clearer than in Dellurns.339 As noted above, the
D.C. Court of Appeals had previously determined that the statute at issue
in Dellums violated the First Amendment, and the court had imposed a
340
limiting construction that required officers to provide fair warning.
Significantly, however, the D.C. Circuit noted that Cox would have
required the same result.34' Thus, the D.C. Circuit effectively
acknowledged that the right to fair warning required of the officers at
issue exactly what the First Amendment required of the statute more
broadly. Similarly, the Second Circuit in Papineau held that, "even if
[officers] had a lawful basis to interfere" with a demonstration-i.e.,
even if the statute at issue, as applied to the demonstrators, complied
with the First Amendment-the First Amendment still regulated the
manner in which officers interfered, requiring them to provide fair
warning. 34 Finally, as described above in Part I.B, the Seventh Circuit
in Vodak implicitly derived the standards it attributed to the right to fair
warning from the requirements the First Amendment imposed on the
parade-permitting scheme at issue.343 Thus, Courts of Appeals have
effectively, if unconsciously, treated the right to fair warning as a form of
First Amendment review that applies to officer conduct, invoking it in
addition to, or as an alternative to, broader First Amendment review of
statutes and ordinances.
In contrast to the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause and
the Fourth Amendment appear to provide no explanation for the focus on
how officers enforce the statutes at issue. While the Court in Cox
invoked Raley's due process defense, it provided no satisfactory
339. See supra text accompanying notes 89-107.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 97-102.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 104-107.
342. Papineau v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 60 (2d Cir. 2006).
343. See supra text accompanying notes 266-274.
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explanation for why that defense would apply.344 Indeed, the Cox
majority's suggestion that officers could provide binding interpretations
of the law when administering traffic regulations raises two seemingly
insurmountable difficulties: first, the statute at issue did not actually
regulate traffic; 345 and, second, the Court acknowledged that the statute
clearly applied to the demonstrators in question, thereby undercutting the
346
need for any interpretation, much less a binding one. Later decisions
by Courts of Appeals simply compound the problem. By invoking the
right to fair warning even in cases where officers have only implicitly
permitted certain actions, Courts of Appeals appear to have dispensed
with Raley's requirement that officers "clearly" allow the conduct at
issue.347 Indeed, if officers can "permit" conduct simply by declining to
enforce a statute, then the due process defense articulated in Raley
conflicts with the judiciary's "deep-rooted" recognition of "law-
enforcement discretion.,348 Thus, principles of due process appear to
provide no satisfactory answer to the question of why courts enforcing
the right to fair warning focus on officers' actions, rather than the
statutes the officers invoke.
Neither does the Fourth Amendment provide any answer. While
the Fourth Amendment focuses courts' attention on whether officers
have acted reasonably, it does so by asking whether officers have "a
reasonable ground for [the] belief' that a suspect violated a statute.349 In
the vast majority of circumstances, officers do not need to provide fair
warning in order to form such a belief.35° Moreover, even courts that
invoke the Fourth Amendment when protecting the right to fair warning
344. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 425-26 (1959) (creating a defense whenever
an officer, while "speaking for the State," "clearly t[ells]" someone that conduct is
permitted).
345. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
346. Cox 11, 379 U.S. at 568.
347. Raley, 360 U.S. at 426.
348. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2005). See also
supra text accompanying notes 246-249.
349. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
350. Cf United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943) (interpreting a
statute to criminalize conduct even though "consciousness of wrongdoing be totally
wanting"). Indeed, the passage and publication of a statute frequently provides the
necessary warning. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 108 (1985).
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do not attribute the requirement of fair warning to Fourth Amendment
principles, instead characterizing it as an unwritten element of the
underlying statute.35' Because the Fourth Amendment inquiry need not
analyze whether officers have provided fair warning, and does so only
where contextual considerations require it, nothing suggests that Fourth
Amendment principles somehow explain such analysis. Thus, only First
Amendment considerations provide a convincing answer to the primary
question raised by Cox and its progeny, namely, the question of why
courts ask about warning in the first place.
2. When and How Can Officers Revoke Permission? - Cox also
raised a second question: why could officers not revoke the limited
permission they granted to Cox simply because his conduct violated the
prohibition on demonstrating near the courthouse?352 Framing the right to
fair warning as a narrower form of First Amendment scrutiny renders an
immediate answer: if courts focus on officers' actions because a statute
poses problems under the First Amendment, then they must require
officers to act in a manner that does not recreate those same First
Amendment problems. The majority opinion in Cox disapproved of
officers' dispersal order almost explicitly on First Amendment grounds.
Specifically, the Cox Court held that officers had not provided a "valid
reason for the dispersal order" under the First Amendment and that, if the
statute had given the officers the "unfettered discretion" they exercised,
it would have amounted to an unconstitutionally broad prior restraint on
expression.353 These restrictions on officer discretion, when read in
conjunction with the majority's earlier insistence that the statute
complied with the First Amendment,354 suggest that the Court implicitly
applied a limiting construction. In other words, only because the Court
interpreted the statute to limit officer discretion could the statute
withstand First Amendment scrutiny. Thus, since limitations on officer
discretion rescued the statute from unconstitutionality, the officers could
not invoke the statute as a justification for broader discretion.
Later decisions by Courts of Appeals have adopted a similar
reasoning, suggesting that those courts interpret Cox to vindicate First
351. See supra text accompanying notes 264-265, 271-276.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
353. Cox 11, 379 U.S. at 572-73.
354. Id. at 564.
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Amendment concerns. In Vodak, for example, the Seventh Circuit
devoted pages to describing the First Amendment's "background role"-
i.e., the limitations it imposed on the city's ability to require parade
permits.355 Although the Seventh Circuit discussed this "background
role" only after it concluded that officers had not provided fair warning,
it incorporated into its understanding of fair warning the very restrictions
that the First Amendment placed on the parade-permitting requirement at
356issue. For example, while the Seventh Circuit purported to require
warning only where officers had permitted certain conduct, it implicitly
adopted a broad understanding of permission that applied whenever
officers had not imposed the types restrictions the First Amendment
357would have permitted. In other words, fair warning constituted a
mechanism for imposing restrictions that complied with the First
Amendment, one to which officers could resort whenever they had
initially failed to impose such restrictions. Thus, the Seventh Circuit,
much like the Supreme Court in Cox, effectively understood the right to
fair warning to apply the same limitations to officers' actions that the
First Amendment imposed on the parade-permitting ordinance.
Once again, the jurisprudence interpreting the Due Process
Clause and the Fourth Amendment, unlike that construing the First
Amendment, provides no satisfactory explanation for the limitations that
Cox imposed on officers' discretion. The majority in Cox did not attempt
to explain its decision under the Due Process Clause, and such an
explanation would have made little sense.358 While Cox initially had a
355. Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738, 749-51 (7th Cir. 2011).
356. See supra text accompanying notes 271-276.
357. Vodak, 639 F.3d at 750. These restrictions included insisting that
demonstrators adhere to an "intended march route" and preparing "reasonable
measures for preventing the demonstration from spilling over the boundaries." Id.
The Seventh Circuit stated only that the First Amendment permitted these
restrictions, and did not claim that it required them. Nonetheless, the court evidently
intended to instruct officers on how to simultaneously comply with the First
Amendment's requirement that officers permit spontaneous demonstrations and
avoid having to give on-the-spot warnings to large groups of confused people. As
argued below, a right to spontaneously demonstrate would have little meaning if
officers could subsequently arrest demonstrators without providing fair warning. See
infra text accompanying notes 368-371.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60 (discussing the majority
opinion's invocation of the First Amendment).
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defense under Raley because the sheriff had "clearly told" him he could
march, he should not have had any such defense after officers had
ordered him to disperse, thereby unambiguously revoking their prior
permission. The majority opinion dismissed the dispersal order on the
ground that officers had not provided a valid reason for it. Nonetheless,
the majority did not suggest that the Due Process Clause would have
required such a reason, and it failed to explain why the statute the
officers sought to enforce would not have provided the necessary
justification.35 9 The Fourth Amendment provides even less support for
the majority's reasoning. Because the Fourth Amendment requires courts
to view circumstances from "the standpoint of an objectively reasonable
police officer, ' '360 analysis under that provision would have led the Cox
majority to ask not whether officers had provided a valid reason, but
instead whether a reasonable officer could have.361 Thus, only the First
Amendment can plausibly explain the Cox majority's decision to require
officers to provide a valid reason for revoking the permission they had,
previously granted to demonstrators.
3. Does a Right to Fair Warning Exist in Cases of Implicit
Permission? - Whereas Cox recognized a right to fair warning where
officers had given demonstrators explicit permission, later cases,
specifically Buck and Vodak, have enforced that right even where-- 362
officers had only implicitly permitted the relevant conduct. The
extension of the right to fair warning recognized in Buck and Vodak
raises two questions. First, should the right to fair warning apply even.
where officers have not provided the kind of explicit permission that the
Supreme Court considered in Cox? Second, if the right to fair warning
protects demonstrators who have received only implicit permission, what
does that fact suggest about the right's constitutional basis?
A simple fact about mass demonstrations answers the first
question. Where an enormous crowd has gathered, officers can
communicate with only a small fraction of its members, and those who
do not receive direct communications can know what officers have
359. Cox 11, 379 U.S. at 572. See also supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
360. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
361. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153-54 (2004). See also Mozzochi v.
Borden, 959 F.2d 1174, 1180 (2d Cir. 1992).
362. See supra text accompanying notes 142-143, 166-167.
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permitted only by observing the behavior of others.363 In such
circumstances, the vast majority of demonstrators will have no way of
distinguishing between actions that officers merely tolerate and actions
that they invite, i.e., between implicit and explicit permission.364 Thus,
applying the right to fair warning in cases of explicit, but not implicit,
permission would amount to a distinction without a difference for the
vast majority of demonstrators. Cox reinforces this point. Only after Cox
was separated from the marchers and "brought to" the police chief did he
receive explicit permission to demonstrate across from the courthouse.
365
The rest of the demonstrators apparently received no communications
from the officers, and they simply proceeded to an area where they were
"directed by Cox." 36 6 As a result, those demonstrators may not have
known whether Cox had obtained permission or had instead decided to
367
defy the officers, something he had done before. Conditioning the right
to fair warning on the content of Cox's private conversation, then, would
have altered the protections the majority of demonstrators enjoyed, even
though they had acted based on the same information and in an identical
fashion. Courts of Appeals have correctly avoided such a strained
interpretation of Cox.
Only the First Amendment explains why the right to fair warning
should apply in both cases of explicit and implicit permission. As
described above, the First Amendment creates a right to spontaneously
demonstrate in response to emerging events, and it requires officers to
craft exceptions to traffic laws that would interfere with the exercise of
363. For discussions of the difficulty of communicating a message to
thousands of demonstrators, see Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir.
2011) ("[T]here was no mechanism (at least no mechanism that was employed) for
conveying a command to thousands of people stretched out on Oak Street between
the inner drive and Michigan Avenue."); Garcia v. Bloomberg, 865 F. Supp. 2d 478,
489 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("[T]he surrounding clamor interfered with the ability of
demonstrators as few as fifteen feet away from the bull horn to understand the
officer's instructions."), aff'dsub nom. Garcia v. Does, 764 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2014).
364. Of course, demonstrators who hear and defy warnings have received fair
warning and thus cannot invoke any defense. See, e.g., Faustin v. City and Cnty. of
Denver, Colo., 423 F.3d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir. 2005).
365. Cox], 379 U.S. at 540-41.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 540 ("Kling asked Cox to disband the group .... Cox did not
acquiesce in this request but told officers that they would march by the
courthouse....").
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such a right.368 If officers could, after permitting spontaneous
demonstrations, arrest demonstrators either for disobeying commands of
which the demonstrators had no knowledge or for engaging in actions
that the demonstrators believed officers had permitted, then the right to
369spontaneously demonstrate would be chilled. In effect, fear of
unforeseen or unforeseeable arrest would prevent many demonstrators
from spontaneously demonstrating at all.370 The First Amendment
rationale for applying the right to fair warning in cases of implicit
permission is strikingly similar to the one on which the Supreme Court
relied in Cox: where courts focus on officers' discretion in order to
resolve a First Amendment problem with the statute-here, the need for
parade-permitting schemes and other traffic laws to allow spontaneous
demonstrations-they cannot permit officers to take actions that would
create the same problem. 37 If statutes cannot ban spontaneous marches,
then officers cannot act in a way that deters it.
Grounding the right to fair warning in the Due Process Clause
would raise severe doubts about whether the right applies to
demonstrators who have received only implicit permission. In cases of
implicit permission, officers have not "clearly told" demonstrators
anything, and thus the Raley defense should not apply.372 Indeed, courts
have not permitted defendants to invoke Model Penal Code
§ 2.04(3)(b)(iv) based on the defendants' beliefs about what officers
communicated to others, holding instead that a statement "must be made
directly to the defendant" in order to "trigger an entrapment-by-estoppel
defense.,373 For example, in United States v. Eaton, the Eleventh Circuit
upheld a defendant's conviction for illegally importing snakes even
though the defendant testified at trial that "other missionaries had hand-
368. See supra note 288.
369. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002) ("The
Constitution gives significant protection from overbroad laws that chill speech
within the First Amendment's vast and privileged sphere.").
370. While Courts of Appeals have not articulated this rationale, they
frequently analyze whether officers may have arrested those who had no reason to
believe that they had violated the law, precisely the type of arrest that would deter
others from spontaneously demonstrating. See supra notes 309-312 and
accompanying text.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 353-354.
372. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426 (1959).
373. United States v. Eaton, 179 F.3d 1326, 1332 (11 th Cir. 1999).
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carried small quantities of snakes into the United States for at least a
decade with approval from customs officials. 374 Demonstrators who
have received implicit permission are indistinguishable from the
defendant in Eaton; they base their claims of innocence not on what
officers have communicated to them directly, but instead on their beliefs
about what officers have permitted others to do. Thus, conceiving of the
right to fair warning as a defense against entrapment, rooted in the Due
Process Clause, would presumably lead courts to apply the rationale
from Eaton, and thus to provide no protection to demonstrators who had
received only implicit permission.
Neither does the Fourth Amendment explain why demonstrators
who have received only implicit permission should receive protection.
As described above, police officers generally have considerable
discretion over "when and where to enforce city ordinances."375 Officers
who exercise this discretion-for example, by declining to enforce a
statute against a mass of demonstrators until reinforcements arrive-can
reasonably believe that they have not implicitly permitted the behavior in
question.376 Because officers in such cases have a reasonable belief that
they have not permitted conduct that, under existing law, constitutes a
crime, the Fourth Amendment should not prohibit them from makingS377
arrests. Thus, only the First Amendment provides a justification for the
decision by Courts of Appeals to extend the right to fair warning to cases
in which demonstrators have received only implied permission.
4. Do Demonstrators Have a Right to Fair Warning When They
Peacefully Protest Without Permission? - Finally, Papineau raises the
question of whether the right to fair warning can protect demonstrators
even where permission is not an issue. In Papineau, the Second Circuit
attributed a right to fair warning to demonstrators based on their
"undeniable right to continue their peaceable protest activities, even
374. Id. at 1331.
375. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2005) (quoting
City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 62 n.13 (1999)).
376. See supra text accompanying notes 245-249.
377. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (noting that the
Fourth Amendment requires only that officers have a "reasonable ground for the
belief of guilt"); see also supra text accompanying notes 267-268 (arguing that
officers in Vodak could have reasonably believed that they had not permitted the
conduct in which demonstrators had engaged).
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when some in the demonstration might have transgressed the law." '378
Analyzed under the First Amendment, this extension of the right to fair
warning makes perfect sense: permitting officers to forcibly disperse
law-abiding demonstrators based on factors beyond those demonstrators'
control would deter expressive conduct that falls within the First
Amendment's core area of protection. Because many of the
demonstrators in Papineau had conformed their conduct to the law-and
were subject to dispersal based only on the actions of a few-their belief
in the legality of their actions was, even in the absence of permission, no
less reasonable than the beliefs of demonstrators in Dellums, Vodak, and
Buck. Thus, the Second Circuit persuasively found that, in light of their
equally reasonable beliefs, the demonstrators in Papineau should receive./379
the same protections afforded to demonstrators in other cases.
Once again, however, the Due Process Clause and the Fourth
Amendment provide no basis for such an extension of the right to fair
warning. Turning first to the Due Process Clause, the officers in
Papineau told the demonstrators nothing, and thus they certainly did not
"clearly" tell the demonstrators that others' actions would not subject the
entirety of the demonstration to forcible dispersion.38° As a result, the
demonstrators had no argument hat the officers had induced their actions
in violation of due process. The Fourth Amendment does not explain the
Second Circuit's rationale in Papineau either. In fact, the Second Circuit
conducted its analysis of the right to fair warning after explicitly
assuming that the officers had "a lawful basis to interfere with the
demonstration" under the Fourth Amendment.381 Thus, only the First
Amendment explains the extension of the right to fair warning that the
Second Circuit recognized in Papineau.
Of the constitutional provisions that might plausibly create
demonstrators' right to fair warning, only the First Amendment provides
convincing answers to the questions raised by existing doctrine. In short,
where statutes and ordinances raise First Amendment problems, but
cannot reasonably be narrowed, courts will examine officers'
enforcement of those statutes, requiring officers to proceed in a manner
378. Papineau v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 60 (2d Cir. 2006).
379. Id. at 60-61 & n.6.
380. Id. at 60. See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426 (1959).
381. Papineau, 465 F.3d at 60.
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that avoids First Amendment problems. As described, the right to fair
warning effectively narrows the scope of First Amendment review,
applying it to officer conduct rather than to a statute. Although this
account of the right to fair warning illuminates existing doctrine,
explaining why courts have made decisions that might otherwise appear
puzzling, it has not yet been assessed in light of the arguments that the
First Amendment does not create the right to fair warning. Accordingly,
the analysis now turns to such an assessment.
B. Arguments Against the First Amendment
Part II.C identified many reasons why courts might hesitate to
identify the First Amendment as the basis of the right to fair warning.
382
Specifically, Part II.C hypothesized that the fact that courts frequently
apply the right to fair warning to demonstrators might simply be a
383coincidence, that the First Amendment might play only a background
role in the analysis,384 and that the First Amendment might not actually
385
require much of officers confronting demonstrators. Part III.B
examines those hypotheses more closely and concludes that they need
not persuade courts. Instead, the arguments for grounding the right to fair
warning in the First Amendment outweigh the arguments against doing
SO.
1. Coincidence - Part II.C speculated that courts may have only
coincidentally applied the right to fair warning first recognized in Raley
to demonstrators. After all, the argument went, Raley did not involve
demonstrators, and thus the right it recognized applied broadly across a
variety of contexts, even if some contexts implicated it more frequently
than others. But this argument is unpersuasive for the same reason that
the Due Process Clause fails to explain courts' application of the right to. • • 386
fair warning to demonstrators. In a number of the cases examined
above, most notably Vodak and Buck, officers had only implicitly
permitted demonstrators to engage in the relevant conduct. As a result,
officers had not "clearly told" the demonstrators that a privilege was
382. See supra text accompanying notes 315-327.
383. See supra text accompanying notes 315-318.
384. See supra text accompanying notes 319-322.
385. See supra text accompanying notes 323-327.
386. See supra text accompanying notes 372-374.
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available to them, and the defense recognized in Raley should not have
387
applied. Because the Raley defense should not have applied, courts
have not simply recognized the same right across a variety of contexts.
Instead, something specific to demonstrators has altered how courts have
reviewed officers' behavior. As argued above, only the First Amendment
convincingly explains the protections courts have extended to
388
demonstrators. Thus, the fact that demonstrators exercise their First
Amendment rights in the cases considered above is not a coincidence at
all, but instead plays a critical role in courts' analyses.
2. A background role - Next, Part II.C considered whether, as
the Seventh Circuit suggested in Vodak, the First Amendment might play
only a "background role" in the analysis.389 As discussed above,
however, what the Seventh Circuit characterized as a "background role"• •390
was in fact quite prominent. Because the First Amendment required
officers to create exceptions to the applicable parade-permitting
requirement, it also logically prohibited officers from acting in a way that
would deter demonstrators from availing themselves of those exceptions.
Thus, even when the Seventh Circuit appeared to assess the
reasonableness of officers' actions under the Fourth Amendment, it
based its understanding of reasonableness on First Amendment
considerations, such as the need to avoid deterring expressive conduct. In
short, far from playing only a background role, the First Amendment
permeated the Seventh Circuit's entire analysis.
3. The feeble First Amendment - Finally, and most troublingly,
Part II.C hypothesized that the First Amendment may not create
demonstrators' right to fair warning because it imposes only weak
constraints on the regulation of demonstrations. As noted, the First
Amendment does not compel legislatures to adopt "the least restrictive or
least intrusive means" of regulating the flow of traffic,39' and courts will
consider the abstract interests of parties not before them only in cases of
14 392"substantial" overbreadth. Nonetheless, the First Amendment imposes
387. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426 (1959).
388. See supra text accompanying notes 336-343, 353-357, 368-371.
389. Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738, 751 (7th Cir. 2011).
390. See supra text accompanying notes 271-276.
391. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 (1989) (quoting
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
392. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
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one very important requirement on local governments: namely, that they
permit spontaneous demonstrations in response to developing events.393
This requirement, although simple in theory, becomes quite complicated. 394
in practice. Indeed, any official action that would deter a reasonable
demonstrator from exercising her right to spontaneously demonstrate
arguably qualifies as a substantial infringement, and courts' analyses of
officers' conduct demonstrate a sensitive awareness to that possibility.395
Thus, the First Amendment's requirements with respect to
demonstrations do not appear feeble at all. Instead, the First Amendment
appears to impose exactly those requirements that courts have attributed
to demonstrators' right to fair warning.
Upon reexamination, the arguments that the First Amendment
does not create demonstrators' right to fair warning appear unpersuasive.
Thus, because the First Amendment best explains existing doctrine, it
provides the most likely constitutional foundation for the right that courts
have recognized. Having reached this conclusion, analysis now turns to
what it means to characterize the right to fair warning as a First
Amendment right.
C. Fair Warning as a First Amendment Right
Why not conclude that the Due Process Clause, the Fourth
Amendment, and the First Amendment work in concert to produce the
right to fair warning? As described above, courts apply a more exacting
form of due process review in cases that implicate the First
396Amendment. Moreover, many of the cases enforcing the right to fair
warning involve the arrest of demonstrators, and only the Fourth
Amendment addresses when officers may reasonably make such arrests.
Thus, why not argue that the Due Process Clause and the First
Amendment together determine whether demonstrators have acted
illegally, and that the Fourth Amendment in turn governs when officers
may reasonably believe that demonstrators' conduct justifies an arrest?
393. See supra note 288.
394. See Vodak, 639 F.3d at 741, 749-50.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 310-312.
396. See supra text accompanying notes 227-229.
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Practical considerations counsel against this approach.
Specifically, courts charged with enforcing the right to fair warning need
guidance on how to apply it, and the most difficult questions arise when
the principles underlying the Due Process Clause, the Fourth
Amendment, and the First Amendment come into conflict. The above
analysis suggests that when conflicts emerge-most notably in cases
where officers have only implicitly permitted demonstrators' actions-
courts focus on the requirements of the First Amendment. Accordingly,
this Part concludes by discussing how courts should give effect to First
Amendment principles when enforcing demonstrators' right to fair
warning.
Only a narrow class of cases will implicate the First Amendment
right to fair warning. Specifically, courts will consider that right only
when a statute or ordinance raises First Amendment problems, but the
traditional remedy of invalidation appears unsatisfactory.397 Most
commonly, invalidation will dissatisfy courts because the statute cannot
reasonably be narrowed. As described above, courts avoid invalidation
by focusing on how officers enforce a statute. To vindicate First
Amendment principles, courts must ask whether the officers have,
through their enforcement actions, resolved the statute's First
Amendment problems. Put somewhat differently, courts must ask if
officers have enforced a statute as though it were a narrower provision
that complied with the First Amendment's requirements.
The cases in which courts have already considered
demonstrators' right to fair warning identify at least two factors that
courts should keep in mind when answering these questions. First and
foremost, courts must ask whether officers' actions chill the exercise of
First Amendment rights that the statute infringes. The threat of a chilling
effect is particularly acute in cases that implicate the right to fair warning
because the applicable statutes appear, albeit illegitimately, to prohibit
conduct that demonstrators have a First Amendment right to undertake.
In such circumstances, uncertainty about the legality of certain conduct,
especially when combined with such serious sanctions as arrest or
forcible dispersal, will encourage demonstrators to err on the side of
caution, refraining from the exercise of their First Amendment rights.
The threat caused by uncertainty potentially explains why the Seventh
397. See supra text accompanying notes 332-335.
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Circuit in Vodak insisted that officers clearly explain exactly what they
had forbidden, interpreting them to have permitted anything they had not
unambiguously proscribed.398 Officers can avoid uncertainty, and thus
any chilling effect, by acting in a manner that gives demonstrators a
reasonable opportunity to conform their conduct to officers' demands.
399
Fair warning gives such an opportunity almost by definition, and its
suitability for that purpose perhaps explains why Courts of Appeals have
adopted the language of fair warning, which evokes the Due Process
Clause, while enforcing a First Amendment right. Given the likelihood of
uncertainty in cases that implicate the First Amendment right to fair
warning, courts considering that right must ask whether officers have
truly resolved a statute's First Amendment problems or whether they
have instead, by chilling the exercise of First Amendment rights, merely
replaced a formal ban with an informal one.
Cox identified a second factor that courts must bear in mind
when enforcing the right to fair warning. Courts considering the First
Amendment have traditionally shown great skepticism towards any
exercise of enforcement discretion, believing that officers may
discriminate between different points of view and therefore slant or stifle
the public discourse.400 Thus, the First Amendment right to fair warning,
somewhat ironically, adopts as a remedy the type of selective
enforcement that courts have long regarded as a source of constitutional
concern. Given the potential of discretionary enforcement to create,
rather than rectify, First Amendment problems, courts must vigilantly
review such enforcement. As in Cox, such review may require courts to
analyze officers' motivations in order to ensure that officers have not
acted based on the content of speech, rather than for legitimate
reasons. 40 More generally, however, courts may limit the extent of the
discretion officers exercise by encouraging the police to adopt
procedures that clearly display, to demonstrators and courts alike, how
officers intend to promote the legitimate purposes of the statutes they
enforce. For example, in Vodak, the Seventh Circuit encouraged officers
398. See supra text accompanying notes 167-168.
399. See Papineau v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 60 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting City of
Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1999)).
400. Cox 11, 379 U.S. at 573.
401. Id. at 572 ("Appellant correctly conceived ... that this was not a valid
reason for a dispersal order.").
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to demand that demonstrators provide "a clear idea of the march route, to
hold them to it, and to prepare in advance reasonable measures for
preventing the demonstration from spilling over the boundaries of the
authorized march.40 2 Such procedures, if enacted, would have ensured
that officers enforced the statute based on reasons that the First
Amendment regarded as legitimate.
Thus, a First Amendment right to fair warning has a broad scope,
albeit in a narrow class of cases. Rectifying a statute's First Amendment
problems is no easy task. Not only must officers dispel uncertainty about
what is and is not permissible; they must do so in a manner that does not
appear to involve the exercise of undue discretion. How these principles
will play out in future cases is unclear. Nonetheless, the First
Amendment right to fair warning imposes significant burdens on
officers. Such burdens indicate the principal difference between a right to
fair warning grounded in the First Amendment and one based on either
the Due Process Clause or the Fourth Amendment. Unlike the Due
Process Clause and the Fourth Amendment, which focus on preventing
officers from taking certain unconstitutional actions, the First
Amendment attempts to foster demonstrators' abilities to undertake
expressive activity. By demanding that officers accommodate such
activity, the First Amendment right to fair warning creates a presumption
in favor of permitting expression, elevating that presumption above even
the enforcement discretion that officers traditionally enjoy.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the First Amendment, rather than the
Due Process Clause or the Fourth Amendment, provides the
constitutional basis for the right to fair warning that numerous courts
have attributed to demonstrators. Courts enforce the right to fair warning
where they feel reluctant to invalidate a statute or an ordinance that raises
First Amendment problems. Typically, the problematic provision serves
a legitimate purpose that no narrower provision could accomplish. In
such circumstances, courts focus on how officers have enforced the
relevant provision, effectively asking whether officers have resolved the
problems the provision creates. Thus, the right to fair warning functions
402. Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738, 750 (7th Cir. 2011).
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as a narrowed form of First Amendment review. By applying First
Amendment principles to officers' enforcement of a statute, courts
attempt to vindicate demonstrators' First Amendment rights without
disturbing the underlying legislative regime.
The right to fair warning demands more attention. Locating the
right to fair warning in the First Amendment raises numerous questions.
For example, does framing a First Amendment right in seemingly
procedural terms, rather than terms that guarantee some substantive right
to speak, alter how courts understand First Amendment protections? The
uncertainty about he right's constitutional origin also raises interesting
questions. What does it mean to have a constitutional right for which
courts have not identified a clear constitutional origin? Does the
existence of such a right deserve consideration in the ongoing debate
between those who would emphasize constitutional text and those who
interpret the Constitution in light of some animating purpose?4°3 Can an
originalist interpretation of the Constitution explain demonstrators' right
to fair warning?404 Finally, what might the analytical confusion
concerning the origin of the right to fair warning tell us about how judges
on Circuit Courts of Appeals approach their tasks? Are these judges
attempting to faithfully apply Cox, or do they instead feel motivated by
the right's intuitive appeal to overlook the difficult issues that skeptical
Justices on today's Supreme Court would surely raise? In questions such
as these, the search for the basis of the right to fair warning reflects and
illuminates the deeper search for our ever-shifting constitutional identity.
403. For a discussion of this issue, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY &
DISTRUST (1980).
404. For a fascinating historical account of the right to spontaneously assemble
in the streets, see E1-Haj, supra note 277.
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